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‘With innovations in science and finance, making disasters ‘dull’ must be our aim. Shocks
don’t need to become full blown disasters, if we better anticipate and pre-plan for shocks,
and reinforce local response capacity. The World Humanitarian Summit and what flows
from it provide a key opportunity to make this happen.’
Stephen O’Brien, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian
Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, United Nations
Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
‘A thought-provoking book with a selection of excellent ideas for managing risks. For a
country like Ethiopia subject to frequent drought the ideas on planning for and managing
shocks in advance makes sense. Climate change makes it even more likely that the
frequency of these shocks will increase in the future, and we need to plan for this. This
kind of approach, linking the public and private sector in insuring and financing disasters,
gives us much to take away and consider.’
Sufian Ahmed, Adviser to the Prime Minister of Ethiopia;
Former Minister of Finance, Ethiopia
‘This book is a timely and valuable contribution to an important global conversation on
addressing risk and vulnerability. Disasters are becoming more severe and the impact of
climate change—the ultimate threat multiplier—is exacerbating food insecurity, water
scarcity, conflict and migration. In Dull Disasters?, the authors offer a persuasive message:
today’s disasters need leaders who do not just respond emotionally and energetically to crises,
but leaderswho use political, legal, and financialmechanisms that result in better preparedness.’
Gloria Grandolini, Sr. Director Finance and Markets
Global Practice, The World Bank Group
‘Countries have a great deal to gain from anticipating the use of a portfolio of financial
instruments to improve their capacity to cope with disasters and manage catastrophic
risks. Doing so requires careful diagnostics, design, experimentation, and evaluation. Yet,
this is a vastly under-researched topic. In that perspective, the book makes a unique
contribution to the literature by critically summarizing the current state of research on
this issue and constructing a research agenda. This will be most useful in guiding future
research on the management of disaster risk and recovery.’
Alain de Janvry, Professor of Agricultural & Resource
Economics, University of California at Berkeley
‘Natural catastrophes are increasing in frequency and severity. What is more, the gap
between economic and insured losses has remained stubbornly large. The consequences
are especially severe in emerging and developing countries, which are both the worst hit
and the least prepared. Tools exist to narrow that gap using innovative solutions that can
help countries, cities and individuals preserve hard-won development gains—even in the
face of floods, earthquakes, adverse weather and other setbacks. This book highlights a
sensible way forward to make the world more resilient.’
Martyn Parker, Chairman Global Partnership, Swiss Re
‘Given the increasing frequency and severity of natural disasters brought on by climate
change and the stress of massive numbers of displaced people placed on all of society due to
man-made disasters, planning for disasters is increasingly crucial for society. This book
brings the needs, principles and processes together in a highly readable fashion. It is a must
read for all policy makers and students of public, private, and non-government institutions.’
Jerry Skees, H. B. Price Professor of Agricultural Policy and Risk,
University of Kentucky
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PREFACE
This book stems from our urge to communicate that there is abetter way of protecting people from the dire effects of natural
disasters, particularly in developing countries. As academics and pro-
fessionals, we have worked on risk and insurance for much of our
careers. In the pages that follow, we want to share what we have
learned, and, in doing so, contribute to better thought and action on
how to shield people and property from the consequences of extreme
natural events such as floods, droughts, earthquakes, and pandemics.
In short, we will look at how to ‘dull’ disasters, making sure that such
events do not lead to enduring levels of hardship.
One of us, Stefan, has studied for decades how risk affects people in
some of the poorest settings in the world, such as in Ethiopia and
Tanzania, but also how the poor have devised ingenious ways to limit
the consequences of shocks to their incomes and livelihoods. And yet,
despite their valiant attempts, they continue to struggle to handle
extreme events such as droughts or floods, which have bleak short-
and long-term consequences for children and adults. They end up
losing their meagre possessions, risk dying too young, or become
disabled from poor nutrition. One of the reasons for writing this
book is to promote better ways of helping people avoid these
outcomes.
Daniel was first a trained actuary, before studying to become an
economist. He brings the world of finance and insurance to these
problems, asking what can finance do (and what it cannot do) to
improve risk management? As researchers, we collaborated in think-
ing through improving systems for financing risks at the household
level. Can insurance ever make sense? Are the current pilot initiatives
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really offering solutions? Can we find ways of designing insurance
systems to complement and strengthen the risk-coping mechanisms
poor people already use?
In recent years, we both have become strongly immersed in the
world of development policy and practice. Daniel joined the
Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance Program, a partnership
between the World Bank and the Global Facility for Disaster Reduc-
tion and Recovery (GFDRR), designed to help governments and their
partners improve how they manage disaster risk. He has worked with
some forty developing countries towards implementing the sort of
solutions described in this book, and he has seen first-hand the
commitment of professionals and the importance of them working
together towards politically sellable solutions. Unfortunately, quite a
few countries are continuing to find the job of disaster risk manage-
ment challenging. But there are clearly positive lessons to be learned
from other countries, and we share some of these in this book.
Stefan is Chief Economist at the Department for International
Development (DFID), the government department responsible for
the UK’s development aid and policy. At DFID, he advises on more
or less anything and everything. Anyone working at DFID, one of the
world’s largest humanitarian and development donors, cannot help
but be struck by the state of the global humanitarian system. It is
under pressure—even broke, it is said—drained financially by large
and costly conflict-related humanitarian crises. Finding better funding
models, at least for problems that are more tractable, such as for
natural disasters, is more important than ever.
Both of us are convinced that at both the country and global levels
people can be better protected against the dire consequences of
extreme natural events. Although what we have learned about risk
and insurance is important, we have realized from our work that
things poor people themselves have found to work well could serve
as models for application nationally and globally. Across the world
and throughout history, people have set up what are essentially
mutual insurance arrangements in which groups support each other,
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abiding by clear and credible rules that make the arrangements sus-
tainable. These were the types of arrangements we have studied at the
local level in Ethiopia.
Clearly, the national and global challenges in dealing with natural
disasters are tougher than the problems these groups can solve.
Nevertheless, in this book we will show that the rules and systems
these groups use are essentially sound protection principles that could
inspire national governments and international agencies as well. It will
no doubt not be easy to move towards the new approach laid out in
this book. That will require careful technical work as well as courage
and commitment by political leaders. Some have risen to this chal-
lenge with more credible disaster planning and financing. It is hoped
that this book will inspire others to follow.
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C O N T E N T S
1
DEALING WITH DISASTERS
It should and can get better
In recent years, typhoons have struck the Philippines and Vanuatu;earthquakes have rocked Haiti, Nepal, Afghanistan, and Pakistan;
floods have swept through Pakistan and Mozambique; and droughts
have hit Kenya and Somalia. All led to loss of life and livelihoods and
destroyed infrastructure, buildings, and businesses.1 Recovery will
take years.
Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda), which hit the Philippines in November
, killed over , people; the economic losses totalled about
US$. billion. In Nepal, more than , people were killed in the
April  earthquake, and many more were injured. Thousands of
homes and even entire villages were destroyed, and lives will have to
be rebuilt. The  earthquake and tsunami in the Indian Ocean
region and the  earthquake in Haiti are still the worst disasters in
recent times, each killing more than , people.
In Kenya, drought affected more than a million farmers in ,
battering their incomes and their ability to feed their families and keep
their children in school. It can be worse: in  drought in the Horn of
Africa contributed to tens of thousands of deaths in Somalia, perhaps
half of them young children.2 And it may get even worse: one of
the likely effects of climate change is to increase the frequency of the
extreme weather events that cause many of these disasters.3
Then there was the Ebola virus outbreak in , revealing how a
pandemic in very poor countries can wreak havoc. More than ,
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people were confirmed to have died in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra
Leone.4
It would be wrong to suggest the world turns a blind eye when
disasters strike. To the contrary, the media usually beam within the
country and across the world horrifying images of the suffering.
National politicians promise decisive action. Politicians from rich
countries voice their concern and publicly instruct agencies to provide
crisis funds to offer relief. Global entertainment stars and television
news anchors take heavily promoted emotional trips to disaster
zones. Ordinary people respond to appeals with generous donations.
Volunteers and experts supported by specialized non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and international and government agencies
work with the utmost commitment to bring affected areas back to
their feet. And across the world, people support the fundamental
motivation behind humanitarian aid: that saving lives and alleviating
suffering are the right thing to do. Despite this, the disaster responses
often seem insufficient, slow, and not well coordinated.
But does it have to be like this? Do extreme events have to turn into
disasters with huge losses of life and suffering? Should responses be
full of public emotion, painful media images, and political blame
games among international, national, and local politicians that never-
theless prove to be slow and inadequate?
We don’t think so. But it depends on all those involved declaring
their willingness to learn properly from experiences around the world
and to apply insights from the latest research across a range of
disciplines. In this book, we will show how harnessing the lessons
from finance and economics, complemented with evidence from
political science, psychology, and the natural sciences, can and does
make governments, civil society, private firms, humanitarians, and
international organizations much better prepared to deal with natural
disasters,5 thereby reducing the risks to people and economies. We
want to make the responses to these events less emotional, less
political, less headline-grabbing, and more something that could
become ‘business as usual’.
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What Does This Book Do?
This book lays out the key problems that can cause extreme natural
events to turn into natural disasters; takes the reader through a range
of solutions that have been implemented around the world to address
these problems; provides an overview of what works and what does
not based on the evidence; and presents a framework that ties all of
this together. Some of these pieces have been analysed individually
before, but this book aims to offer a fresh perspective, drawing various
strands together for the first time, including the crucial issue of how
disasters are financed, which is often overlooked.
We want to persuade our readers that extreme events do not need
to lead to as much hardship and loss of life as at present. We are not
just making it up: our arguments are based on the latest research and
evaluations of past disaster responses worldwide and other academic
research. Each chapter also offers, at the end, both a useful recap and a
snapshot of the relevant academic literature. These snapshots of the
literature convey the research foundation of our narrative and are a
guide to a more in-depth treatment.
What this book does not do is criticize the thousands of deeply
committed individuals working tirelessly to bring relief to disaster-
torn areas and to prevent further suffering. Our critique is about the
national and international systems behind these people, and how
there is still a widespread systemic failure to prepare for disaster before
it strikes. Our main thesis, which is developed, motivated, and inter-
rogated throughout the book, is that three things need to be put in
place before a disaster to protect lives and livelihoods:
. A coordinated plan for post-disaster action agreed in advance
. A fast, evidence-based decision-making process
. Financing on standby to ensure that the plan can be implemented.
If these three things seem obvious, there are plenty of examples
in which some or all of themwere not in place, resulting in unnecessary
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suffering and economic losses. More important, they are not systemat-
ically embedded in national and global disaster response systems.
A myriad of agencies at the national and international levels are
entrusted with providing short-term support to those in need when a
disaster strikes in order to save lives and alleviate suffering. They are
the agencies and departments of local and national governments,
various agencies of the United Nations, and national and international
NGOs. Collectively, these agencies and their funders are known as the
global humanitarian system.6 There is also a range of institutions that
support the more medium- and long-term responses and reconstruc-
tion after disasters, including national governments, donor govern-
ments, and development financial institutions such as the World Bank
and regional development banks.
We believe this system has serious flaws. The post-disaster decision-
making process is far too politicized, leading to delays, poor decisions,
and bad coordination of effort. Recent disasters such as the earthquake
in Nepal or Ebola in West Africa are good case studies of the com-
mitments nationally and internationally to provide support, but also
of what can go wrong in decision making and the consequences. The
good news is that insights from economists and political and behav-
ioural scientists are at hand to improve this situation. And science
is helping to achieve much better predictions of when disasters
will occur and the damage they will cause. But those affected need
more than early warning; they need early action that is evidence-based
and fast.
Fast decisions are only sensible if they are related to credible,
coordinated plans. Every time a natural disaster hits any part of the
world, the newspaper headlines ten days later can be written in
advance: ‘Why isn’t the response more coordinated? Still no food or
water for some areas’. The truth is, everybody argues for coordination
but nobody likes to be coordinated.
Evaluations of recent disaster responses contain vivid examples of
these coordination failures. For example, a cross-agency report on the
earthquake response in  in Haiti found that there was very poor
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coordination among humanitarian aid organizations after the earth-
quake; their responses lacked planning and thus were poorly adapted
to local circumstances. Many parallel structures were set up inside
and outside government, duplicating effort and feeding coordination
failures and power battles.7 Evaluations of the response to Typhoon
Haiyan in the Philippines in  highlighted similar failures.8 A large
response followed, but international donors were unaware of national
structures and capacity. Differences in understanding between the
international humanitarian community and the local government of
emergency relief and recovery phases led to poor coordination and
parallel structures.9
Poor coordination and an ineffective response are not only the
standard findings in developing countries. In  Hurricane Katrina
slammed into New Orleans in the US state of Louisiana. The storm
and the subsequent floods killed more than , people and caused
possibly US$ billion in losses. Official evaluations found that the
losses caused by the hurricane stemmed in part from questionable
leadership decisions and capabilities, organizational failures, over-
whelmed rescue and communication systems, and poor multi-agency
coordination leading to a duplication of effort.10 What seems com-
mon sense is rarely in place: a careful, pre-financed plan that has been
approved by all who might be called on to offer support.
Our strongest criticism of the current disaster responses relates to
the way they are financed (post-disaster with no careful pre-disaster
planning). Fortunately, insights from economics and finance can help
solve this problem. At the moment, much of the response to disasters
as well as the entire humanitarian system are funded by voluntary
contributions, collected via appeals to donor governments and the
public after a disaster takes place. National and local governments also
scramble for resources by reallocating from other budgets. It is as if
financial instruments such as insurance do not exist.
Meanwhile, appeals are not far off from begging bowls, and govern-
ments and donors seem at times to resemble benefactors for a good
cause and saviours coming to the rescue rather than participants in
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an organized system in which responses and routes to recovery
are carefully planned beforehand using sound financial instruments.
Begging bowls and benefactors—this is a system built on medieval
financial principles. Although science may not always be able to
predict exactly when and where a natural disaster will strike, it can
assess the likelihood of different disasters occurring, and disaster-
management professionals can assess what response would be useful
after each potential disaster. Taken together, these two capabilities
mean that financial planning for sensible disaster response and recov-
ery is possible. Despite this, the current systems appear to ignore
centuries of progress in developing better financial instruments that
can be put to good use to the benefit of those unlucky enough to be
affected by disasters.
The Evidence?
One can easily predict the conclusions drawn from evaluations and
reviews of any disaster response programme a few years later. This
government or agency ‘wasn’t well enough prepared, and also it
should have invested more in disaster risk reduction and resilience
of communities’. ‘The international aid that was supposed to come in
arrived too late.’11 Such evaluations will also point out that the ‘local
roads were not rebuilt for years because of a disagreement between the
local and national government over who would pay for reconstruction’.
The way humanitarian and development support is financed is crucial
here: the financing of the system has to ensure that there are strong
incentives for credible planning and disaster risk reduction—not just to
sit around and wait for a bailout.
Development—that is, a stronger and more inclusive economy and
society—is the best form of resilience to a natural disaster.12 This will
take time, and even then natural hazards will not go away, especially
with climate change lurking. Both the way the national and global
humanitarian system is organized and the way it is financed ignore the
fact that the incentives for disaster risk reduction and for making
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countries and communities far more resilient to natural disasters are
rather poor, and at best an afterthought. And even if the lessons
highlighted are starkest for the developing world, in rich societies
these lessons remain valid. In the United States, failures in decision
making and preparedness planning, poor risk reduction, and the faults
in the ways in which response and recovery finance were organized also
contributed to greater loss of life and more misery from Hurricane
Katrina and the subsequent floods than there should have been.13
There are also plenty of examples—some of them recent and
novel—in which seemingly minor developments in the way disasters
are planned for and financed have had significant positive impacts on
people’s lives. In all examples, the bulk of the planning happens before
the disaster and involves pre-disaster commitments over who will do
what and who will pay for what. In Kenya, for example, donors,
NGOs, the World Bank, and the government are working together
in the Hunger Safety Net Programme. Under this programme, pastor-
alists receive what is effectively an insurance policy—a social safety net
that, without delay and questions, pays a cash transfer to a pre-defined
group when the rains fail and the harvest is bad so they can afford to
buy inputs and food for their families. For even more peace of mind,
they also are given the option of buying affordable insurance to keep
their animals alive. The scheme has simple triggers; donors and
government co-finance it; and costly needs assessments and delays
are avoided. It allows pastoralists to invest in their cows, goats, and
camels without worry that the next drought will ruin them.14
In Mexico, the country’s National Disaster Fund, FONDEN (El
Fondo Nacional para el Desarrollo Nacional), operates a rules-based
system to reconstruct public infrastructure such as roads, hospitals,
and schools after a disaster hits. In this collaboration among the
federal government, state governments, and the private sector, every-
one has agreed to an objective procedure to determine the degree of
damage, and the processes are implemented by an independent third
party and audited by all parties. The result is clarity pre-disaster over
who will pay for what. FONDEN also offers incentives for risk
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reduction, rewarding such investments. Financial markets are used to
lock in this rules-based approach.15
In India, the government and farmers share the cost of crop insur-
ance that allows cheaper input credit because the banks can now trust
that farmers will be able to repay even if their harvests fail. Meanwhile,
farmers are protected and able to invest more in their farms.
In Ethiopia, a major drought in part of the country in  did not
result in major loss of life (unlike in Somalia). One important reason
was that the government, with donor support, had set up the Pro-
ductive Safety Net Programme, which was designed to be scaled up to
absorb more funding and reach more people during a crisis. In  it
managed to expand to support . million people. This was quite a
different result from the – drought when more than ,—
and possibly as many as million—people perished when the country
was in the midst of a civil war.16
So why aren’t there more of these schemes?
These examples from Kenya, Mexico, India, and Ethiopia have
strong similarities. In all these countries, governments and plenty of
local and international players are willing to provide support if natural
hazards cause hardship. Acting on that willingness, all the parties
involved have worked to be prepared in a credible way so that after
a disaster the government and its partners can make a political
announcement that the system is working rather than having to
announce a new ad-hoc initiative. The decision-making process for
the response is rules-based and transparent. The nature of the
response is defined clearly beforehand. And the financing is organized
in a credible way.
In fact, these countries have unintentionally organized themselves
as if they are part of an insurance system, using similar principles. It is
clear which risks are protected and which are not, and who is respon-
sible for covering what, as if governments and their partners entered
into a contract with the individuals and communities involved. These
countries gained credibility by ensuring that the financing is in place,
including using forms of insurance and reinsurance (India, Kenya, and
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Mexico). They agreed up front to cost-sharing rules between govern-
ment and donors (Kenya and Ethiopia), state governments (India and
Mexico), and the individuals protected (India and Kenya). And they
were all conscious of the incentives for moral hazard that plague
insurance markets (whereby insurance may induce those covered to
stop reducing risk because they are now covered). Like a good insur-
ance system, then, they have tried to design systems that offer incen-
tives for disaster risk reduction.
What is described here is a far cry from the shocking images, media
appeals, fund raising, and moral arm-twisting that normally follow a
disaster because underlying these programmes are insurance and
other financial products. And they are more about accountants, finan-
cial management, planning meetings, data, decision-making rules, and
well-prepared logistics. This is our purpose: we want to make disasters
business as usual, not hand-wringing as usual.
A Focus on Natural Disasters
This book is not about every form of human hardship: across the
world, hundreds of millions people are suffering from hunger and
despair, and are even at risk of survival from circumstances beyond
their control. We focus here on extreme natural events and their
consequences. We consider what are called ‘fast-onset’ disasters, linked
to sudden events such as earthquakes, floods, and storms, which
require an immediate response to protect lives as well as a longer-
term recovery from the destruction of homes, infrastructure, and
livelihoods. We also discuss slow-onset disasters, which may start
slowly, but their effects, such as drought and pandemic, become
worse over time, threatening lives and livelihoods. No matter the
type of disaster, however, a timely response is key: the later the
response, the worse the consequences.
Although this book deals with disasters triggered by extreme nat-
ural events, we are very aware that there are other demands for a large-
scale response based on the humanitarian system and the generosity
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of people and government that are not covered here. Despite involv-
ing billions of dollars each year, spending via international agencies
and donors on humanitarian crises related to natural events, including
pandemics, is smaller than spending on crises linked to conflict. What
has been happening in Syria is a clear example. Massive humanitarian
support is needed for the populations affected by conflict, including
internally displaced populations and refugee populations outside the
country’s borders. These conflict-induced crises tend to last many
years, leading to protracted suffering. The financial costs of these
responses are collectively many billions per year, often with little
prospect of resolution and recovery.
Our approach can offer ideas on how to respond to conflict-
induced crises better, not least in the early stages, but there are
important differences between these crises and those stemming
from natural disasters that will make a successful and a more cost-
effective response far harder. We do not want to claim that our
approach is applicable in any kind of simplistic way. Nevertheless,
some of the lessons on response plans, decision making, and financial
planning should offer food for thought for conflict-induced crises as
well. It is true in any case that if the global humanitarian system were
to use the principles advocated in this book to organize its support for
the disasters following extreme natural events, it could focus its
intellectual and financial resources much better on handling these
other crises.
Let’s Dull Disasters!
Economic losses from disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis, cyc-
lones, and flooding are now reaching an average of US$–$
billion a year.17 In the last twenty years, more than , people
died as a direct result of approximately , extreme weather events
alone; millions of people were seriously injured. Most of the deaths
and serious injuries were in developing countries.18
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Meanwhile, highly infectious diseases will continue to emerge or
re-emerge. Natural hazards will not disappear—earthquakes, storms,
and droughts will continue to pose threats. There will be loss of life
and destruction of infrastructure and houses. Lives and livelihoods
will be affected for thousands of people. But, as this book will show,
these extreme events do not need to turn into large-scale humanitar-
ian disasters. Better and faster responses are possible. Faster recovery
with much less hardship or permanent losses of assets and livelihoods
is achievable. Learning from the weaknesses of the current responses
and their financing is the first step. Our thesis is that even though there
is much generosity in the world to support the responses to and
recovery from natural disasters, the funding model, based on mobil-
izing financial resources after disasters take place, is flawed and makes
responses ineffective and late. Being generous after a disaster is too
late. The way forward is to act before disasters strike, preparing
credible plans with rules-based decision-making and early action and
held together with sound financial planning agreed beforehand.
This is not just a technical matter. It will involve political courage
and commitment by leaders across the world. If successful, it will
make a disaster response less of a media spectacle fraught with
emotion and adrenaline. Indeed, it may make disasters a little duller
for the twenty-four-hour news outlets. But, most important, it will
result in disasters that have a less intense impact, as in the other
meaning of ‘dull’. Dulling disasters is what this book is all about.
Recapping . . .
. The world does not turn a blind eye to disasters. Many disasters are
followed by an outpouring of generosity.
. Despite this, disaster responses often seem insufficient, slow, and
not well coordinated, and recovery can take years.
. The main thesis of this book is that the impact of disasters can be
dulled if three things are in place beforehand:
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• A coordinated plan for post-disaster action agreed in advance
• A fast, evidence-based decision-making process
• Financing on standby to ensure that the plan can be implemented.
. The solutions we present throughout this book are based on pre-
agreed, pre-financed, rules-based plans that can be implemented
after a disaster without the need for further political decisions.
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Begging bowls and benefactors
There is something predictable about the way most of us learnabout a natural disaster. It usually starts with a news item on the
radio or television or a Tweet or news alert on a mobile phone. Fast-
onset disasters, such as earthquakes or floods, always tend to make the
headlines. Then reports of the estimated numbers of lives lost and of
the damage caused begin to come in. Politicians and senior officials
may strut before the cameras to demonstrate their leadership by
embracing the three C’s of crisis management: concern about the
situation and suffering, commitment to do something about it, and
control of the situation. When disasters take place in relatively poorer
countries, appeals for aid are quickly broadcast: they take the form of
requests for help from local communities or national governments
and formal appeals to richer countries for contributions to inter-
national agencies or to the public for contributions to non-
governmental organizations (NGOs).
So it was for the Nepal earthquake in April .1 Within a few days,
extensive reports of damage and loss of life were followed by an appeal
by theUnitedNations forUS$million to cover thefirst threemonths
of relief efforts. Across the world media, NGOs appealed for donations
to their efforts on the ground. For slow-onset disasters such as a
drought or a viral outbreak such as Ebola, it is typically not that much
different except that the crisis may not reach the news headlines until it
becomes visible, and even then substantial airtime and social-media
discussions are devoted to debating whether it really is a disaster.
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Once a crisis is clearly imminent, expectations of leadership by
politicians and international organizations, media attention, and appeals
for support are front and centre. What happens next is also predictable:
frustration, fallout, and blame games. Support often comes late, and
when it finally arrives it is described as ineffectual and insufficient. Those
in need expect the authorities to help them, and those delivering the help
seem underprepared and underfunded, and they begin to spar publicly.
Nepal was no exception. Within days, media reports noted the slow
progress of the response, and the political fallout.2
All this makes good news copy, but something more profound is
also at play. There is a clear expectation from those in need, as well as
those seeing need, that assistance will be given. The moral obligation
to help people undergoing hardship because of events clearly beyond
their control is well accepted; indeed, even the most diehard oppon-
ents of international aid sense that humanitarian support is right and
reasonable. This global concern is embedded in international declar-
ations, including the global commitments in UN General Assembly
Resolution /, , which offers humanitarian principles. The
first of these principles, that of ‘humanity’, states: ‘Human suffering
must be addressed wherever it is found. The purpose of humanitarian
action is to protect life and health and ensure respect for human
beings.’ There is, of course, nothing wrong with this principle—
indeed, quite the contrary.
But how is this principle put into practice? Usually not well.
Responses to natural disasters need to be timely and on the right
scale. For example, how local and national governments and inter-
national agencies respond in the immediate aftermath of earthquakes
is crucial to protect lives and livelihoods in the short term, but also to
restrict the scale of the long-term consequences. An early response in
slow-onset disasters is just as critical. As the spread of the Ebola virus
in Africa revealed, containing an Ebola outbreak when there are just a
few dozen or a few hundred cases—as was the case in Uganda in 
and in the Democratic Republic of Congo in —is far less costly
and far easier than when thousands of people are infected—which was
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the situation by August  in West Africa when the World Health
Organization (WHO) declared the epidemic a Public Health Emer-
gency of International Concern and a major international response
was launched. According to data from Kenya and Ethiopia, substan-
tially more lives and millions of dollars can be saved by an early
response to a drought compared with a later response.3
Behind these delays is recurring ambiguity about who is in charge
beforehand to plan and finance the consequences of these extreme
events—that is, who should be taking on the risk and preparing for a
response. This ambiguity leads, in turn, to poor plans and poor
financing arrangements, despite many statements by all concerned
that all human suffering will receive a response.
A Flawed Funding Model
Working backwards from the way responses are financed sheds light
on why this process goes wrong. When a disaster strikes, the first
point of call is usually the government, at both the local and national
levels. Across the world, governments are usually keen to respond, but
they often do not have large contingency budgets—that is, budgets
that are spent only if something exceptional occurs. Even if a govern-
ment had such a budget, it may have already been spent. During a
disaster-related crisis, cash needs to be mobilized, but either this
requires new borrowing (essentially running an overdraft), or a gov-
ernment must reallocate funding from other budgets. This means it is
not free money, and it will have a cost. For example, cash may have to
be raised by cutting government services such as maintaining roads. In
richer countries, borrowing or reallocating funds would be difficult
and costly but politically important enough that it would go forward.
For poor countries, its consequences would be worse because spend-
ing is typically already tight, borrowing is more costly, and realloca-
tions may affect basic government functions. These countries, then,
are likely to turn to global humanitarian agencies and development
partners for support.
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The parties making up the humanitarian system also do not have
large contingency budgets; they operate with something that resem-
bles a cash budget (spending only the resources that are available).
As of December , the humanitarian need (the sum of all global
UN appeals) stood at US$ billion, but only about  per cent of
that amount was funded.4 Behind this scale of underfunding is a
deeply flawed funding model: appeals, linked to a particular crisis.
All the main international agencies and NGOs involved are largely
funded through appeals that solicit voluntary contributions from gov-
ernments and the general public. The size of contributions is not pre-
specified; in fact, no one is obliged to contribute. In the same way, many
poorer countries appeal directly to the international community for
support after disasters—an approach that leads to very uneven funding
and recurring large funding gaps.
This ad-hoc, post-disaster model for financing disasters is hardly
worthy of the twenty-first century. In fact, it feels distinctly medieval.
It is a funding model based on begging bowls, whereby individuals,
communities, local and national governments, international agencies,
and NGOs are required to play the part of a beggar, as though they are
pleading for alms, sitting in a row in front of a medieval cathedral or
mosque. Benefactors may well be committed to digging in their pockets
to share their coins with those who clearly are facing hardship, but their
coins may run out midway through the row. Without more informa-
tion, the benefactors do not know which beggars are the neediest, and
so the neediest might not receive the most benefits. In short, begging
has hardly ever been a stable source of resources to deal with the
vagaries of life, not least when time is of the essence and benefactors
need to make very quick decisions based on limited information.
The Consequences
The consequences of a financial model that encourages reasonable
people and organizations to play the part of a beggar after each
disaster can be dire.
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Ambiguities
The model creates ambiguity about who owns the risk: who will need
to act and who will need to pay for it. Across the world, national and
local governments and politicians will say with confidence that in
the first instance they do. As for developing countries, the various
agencies of the United Nations, such as the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Programme
(WFP), World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Children’s
Fund (UNICEF), and United Nations Office of the Coordinator of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), as well as various big donors, will all
claim they are there to work with governments so that the appropriate
responses and financing materialize. Local and international NGOs and
the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
(IFRC) will also claim to be responsible for responding to crises.
All this is reasonable, and in fact governments should have key
responsibilities. But across all organizations, such statements are hol-
low because there is no guaranteed financing for fulfilling promises.
Credibility requires a finance model that will deliver the funds when
needed. Within countries, the lack of clarity between national and
local governments over who should respond and who should finance
the response leads to ineffectual relief efforts. Evaluations of the
response to Hurricane Katrina in  in the United States brought
this home.5
The Ebola outbreak in West Africa in  was another example of
a situation in which a lack of clarity on who owned the risk and
response was at the core of long delays. Most observers expected the
national governments to own the risk, with WHO offering a second
layer of risk protection in terms of expertise and finance if govern-
ments could not handle it. Indeed, this is how previous outbreaks of
Ebola had been managed. This time, however, national governments
were unable to contain the epidemic, and WHO did not have the
resources to act at scale on this widespread expectation. Large bilateral
donors and their agencies were not prepared to respond quickly once
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this became clear because they did not realize they were carrying the
risk, and therefore they did not have the plans and preparation in place
to scale up to deliver on the response quickly. The result: valuable time
was lost, and, as evaluation reports have shown, the long period of
inaction led to more misery and higher costs.6 One study suggested
that a response one month earlier could have averted more than half
the cases in Sierra Leone.7
Procrastination and Delays
The lack of pre-commitment embedded in begging-bowl financing
also leads to one of the enemies of effective decision making: procras-
tination among implementers as well as donors. Procrastination, the
decision to delay or postpone something, is a well-studied phenom-
enon affecting the decision making of individuals or groups. Accord-
ing to the research, when they are faced with a decision on whether to
act but the choice is not obvious, or when the action required is
demanding and difficult, inaction is the common response.8 In many
recent cases, including slow-onset disasters such as droughts and
pandemics, this has been a real problem. Responding to a possible
large-scale disaster early is harder than taking no action at all, espe-
cially because funding needs to be found at the right scale. The result is
a tendency to procrastinate over acting and committing funding. This
phenomenon was present in the national and international decision
making around the Ebola response in West Africa, as well as in the
responses to the – drought in Somalia and the neighbouring
regions9 and in the recent responses to likely extreme weather events
linked to El Niño. Crises tend to be rather well developed before
decisions are made to respond.
Crying Wolf
Actually, the consequences of begging-bowl financing can be worse.
A funding model based on voluntary contributions and appeals does
not just risk underfunding some causes, thereby leading to delays and
more suffering. It also creates serious distortions and bad incentives
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 31/3/2016, SPi
DU L L D I S A S T E R S ?

that make poor responses more likely. Because underfunding is com-
mon and little pre-committed funding is available, strong incentives
surface among the implementing agencies to exaggerate crises and
appeals. In June , a UN press release suggested and was interpreted
by the international media as meaning that in East Africa the worst
drought in sixty years was under way.10 The truth, however, was that
it was the worst drought in a relatively small number of specific
pastoralist areas in Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia. No doubt, a bad
drought was taking place, but the press release was somewhat parsi-
monious with the truth. Raising false alarms, ‘crying wolf ’ as in
Aesop’s famous fable, is a big risk here: because potential donors are
aware of the incentives for overstatement, many appeals will hardly
receive a response. As it turned out, this particular crisis did end up in
a massive human disaster because the drought coincided with the
raging conflict in Somalia, and responses were late and ineffective.11 It
was not evident, however, that more finance would have avoided the
crisis.
Such an exaggeration for effect is not uncommon, and rarely does
one hear of retractions when the media overstate risks. For example,
some agencies’ declarations and media reports that West Africa was at
risk of famine during the Ebola outbreak in  did not quite have a
truthful ring to them based on the evidence available. If the informa-
tion to be used for decision making is manipulated to overstate the
need, it is difficult for those contributing to the system to make
sensible trade-offs over where and when to contribute.
Fragmented Responses
The funding model also needs political or other leaders to be seen as
doing the right thing. And when the cameras are rolling and after the
crisis has already unfolded, this is the right time to fill the begging
bowl and offer its proceeds to those in need. But for many disasters,
this is too late. That said, let us be clear: there is nothing wrong with
this media attention, and there is nothing wrong with opportunities
for politicians and other leaders to show leadership. Indeed, there is
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much research to suggest that political leadership ensures that natural
hazards do not turn into disasters, and its absence can cause serious
failures—such as in the case of Hurricane Katrina in , in Haiti in
, and in the late responses to the Ebola virus in West Africa in
. An active press is also an effective mechanism for accountability
and better responses. Nobel laureate Amartya Sen argued long ago
that media attention ensured the disappearance of famines in India
after independence.12 Subsequent research revealed how the press and
better competitive elections made this true for the quality of response
across India.13
Meanwhile, another consequence of lack of pre-commitment of
financing to plans and implementers is the incentives it creates for
flag planting and limelight hugging. ‘Everyone loves a good drought’,
as the Indian journalist Palagummi Sainath famously wrote.14
A humanitarian crisis allows the flags of nations and organizations
to be planted, showcasing their generosity and success. Internationally
and locally, a crisis allows politicians to show leadership and seek to
portray themselves as the saviours of those experiencing hardship.
Everyone wants to hug the limelight and show off their effectiveness.
But that kind of grandstanding only exacerbates the incentives for
fragmentation rather than coordination: going it alone makes it easier
to claim to be at the centre of the response, whether as a funder or an
implementer. And it creates a class of benefactors: leaders in receiving
and donor countries and in local and international organizations who
can choose which begging bowl to fill or what to do with their
available cash. Planning beforehand would have seemed futile since
financing only follows a disaster. Therefore, these benefactors will play
a direct role in deciding what the response will look like and how the
subsequent recovery will roll out.
With this funding model, no organization can guarantee before the
onset of disasters that it can offer the right response. Because funding
is not secure, the overall picture is one of incentives for extensive
fragmentation when crises occur rather than for coordination. Each
organization may have plans, but without guaranteed funding of their
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plans none can act. The result is a dispersed, unwieldy system with
much multiplication rather than economies of scale. Those who can
mobilize resources respond, and so whenever a disaster develops,
dozens of national aid agencies, international organizations, and
NGOs all get involved. But each must be sustained, and each needs
resources. Local governments, national leaders, international donors,
and multilateral agencies also vie for their roles: all claim to recognize
the importance of coordination, and yet none of them wants to be
coordinated.
Disaster Risk Reduction and Preparedness
A funding model based on appeals and other begging bowls hardly
encourages national or international organizations to undertake ser-
ious investments in reducing the risk of a disaster and preparedness.
After all, if an organization has no idea how much funding might be
available, how can it plan for the appropriate scale of response?
Without a secure budget, how can it invest before a disaster in a
post-disaster implementation capacity?
But it gets worse. Benefactors are anointed in full view, not from
quiet graft in the shadows. A politician probably will not get credit
for pushing good preparedness plans and investments. Plus, such
planning demands more effort for limited immediate gain. Only
lip service will be paid to investments in early warning systems,
preventive infrastructure investments, building codes and zoning,
and education and technical assistance in preparedness. Why should
a politician invest in a sensible system to reduce risks and enable a
quick response to a strong earthquake if the political benefits from
such a system are likely to be reaped by that politician’s political
successor? These facts of political life tend to lead to procrastination
in setting up good response systems beforehand and in delays in
making firm decisions about how to respond under various
circumstances—after all, decision makers are under little pressure
and the rewards are scarce. And risk-reduction investments will
lose out.
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There is good evidence that electoral politics tends to encourage
these behaviours: political leaders are rewarded by the voters for
offering disaster relief, while disaster preparedness has no impact on
election outcomes. For example, in India incumbent parties are appar-
ently rewarded if they vigorously respond to disastrous weather
events, but only in election years. Relief is much higher, then, in
such years.15 These electoral behaviours are also observed in the
United States. Presidential disaster declarations in affected states are
rewarded by the electorate, but a president is punished if a governor’s
request for relief is denied.16 These behaviours skew incentives in the
choice between relief and preparedness: voters reward the delivery of
disaster relief, but not investments in disaster preparedness.17 Improv-
ing disaster responses and preparedness will require balancing these
incentives.
Moving Beyond a Medieval
System of Finance
So, how can countries and their partners do better in handling disas-
ters? They surely can go beyond a medieval system of finance that
ignores centuries of progress in developing insurance and other finan-
cial protection instruments. Modern financial principles can ensure
certainty in finance in a world of uncertainty.
But decision makers do not necessarily have to go to the City of
London or to Wall Street for ideas and advice. Across the world,
communities have long experimented with finding ways of protecting
themselves against disasters. For example, slum dwellers in Dhaka, the
capital of Bangladesh, can teach them a few things. The buildings in
the slums are built of woven bamboo, and food is cooked inside over
open fires. Highly combustible, the dwellings often catch fire, destroy-
ing dozens of homes and shops in one go. There is no fire insurance
for such informally planned settlements or public compensation after
fires. The solution? Residents have set up groups of a few dozen or
more members. Each week, a cashier collects a fixed amount of money
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from each member and banks it. In the event of a fire, the money is
withdrawn and distributed to the members in proportion to their
contribution. This is an extremely simple form of a reserve or contin-
gency fund, pooled to ensure that it is only used for the designated
purpose: paying for fire losses. When a fire occurs, the cash for
compensation is readily available and disbursed using clear and simple
rules.18
Poor people’s funeral insurance systems across the world also offer
up some lessons. Among the fisherfolk in Cochin in Kerala, India,
early death is all too common. However, funerals can be very expen-
sive, and cash is not readily available when someone dies. Members
of the annual burial fund pay in a fixed sum each week for a year.
If the member or a close relative dies, a payout is offered from the
fund, no strings attached. At the end of the year, if any funds remain
they are distributed to the members. If the fund runs out of cash
during the year, all members are asked to make up the shortfalls in
equal shares.19
The funeral group operated by Muungano, the village union of
women’s groups in the small village of Nyakatoke inWestern Tanzania,
provides insurance that supplements what the traditional village
Bujuni (or ‘mutual help’) association offers at the time of mourning.
The additional protection involves only a small contribution before-
hand, but when someone dies a strictly enforced commitment goes
into effect, and a particular sum of cash is paid by each member to
the deceased family, plus a fixed contribution in kind or in labour.20
In recent years, these groups have expanded their coverage and now
also offer a payout when someone needs to be hospitalized.
Ethiopia has its own version of these funeral societies, usually called
iddirs (see Chapter ). They are based on a simple model, similar to the
one found in Cochin.
All these schemes are group-based versions of insurance, with
fixed regular contributions and fixed payouts when a fire, death, or
serious illness occurs. Such groups are at the root of many of the
largest insurance companies in the world. They operate as a mutual
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fund, a ‘risk pool’ of savings, which is used to pay for pre-specified
risks.21
These examples from around the world point to the kind of
finance model for disaster responses and recovery that would
overcome many of the disincentives and failures of the current
system of voluntary contributions after disasters have unfolded. It
uses insurance principles to finance need and states clearly exactly
who holds the risk: for example, the funeral society’s fund based
on members’ contributions pays for the costs of funerals and
possibly other pre-specified risks. Contributions are collected
beforehand and predictable—no begging bowls required, or at
least liabilities are well defined. The ways in which to raise extra
emergency cash are specified. There is no ambiguity, no gaming,
no procrastination.
These, then, are the elements of a sensible model to deal with the
response to calamities internationally and within countries. The sys-
tem is based on clear-cut decision rules, and there is no ambiguity
about who owns the risk, who needs to respond, and how it is
financed. The incentives to prepare a response and to reduce risks
are in place. And, finally, a financing model offers resources when they
are needed, turning risk and uncertainty into the certainty of support.
No more begging bowls or benefactors.
This is a big ask for political leaders for whom discretion is the
default setting. But in the chapters that follow, we outline how this can
be done. Planners will begin by putting together and packaging pol-
itically sellable alternatives to begging-bowl financing, including
thinking through who will be protected and against what, who will
pay, and what the conditions for protection will be (Chapter ). Then,
in moving from discretion to rules, they will think carefully about
what data will trigger action, and how it will be collected and pro-
tected from fraud and political opportunism (Chapter ). Finally, plan-
ners will help benefactors to pre-commit their funds before disasters
strike in ways that encourage coordination and proper incentives for
risk reduction (Chapter ).
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Recapping . . .
. The post-disaster relationships between national and subnational
governments, governments and farmers, governments and
homeowners, and governments and the international
humanitarian system often take the form of a begging bowl,
although there are notable exceptions.
. Begging bowls arise because of benefactors—the people who
retain discretion over how to allocate their budgets after a disaster
strikes.
. For beneficiaries, begging-bowl financing of disaster risk is fraught
with uncertainty—they do not know what help to expect and
when help will arrive. It can also undermine their incentives to
invest in disaster risk reduction and preparedness. All of these
factors can increase the economic and human costs of
catastrophes.
A Snapshot of the Literature
The effect of an altruistic benefactor on the risk-reduction investments
made by a vulnerable beneficiary has been considered in depth in
economic research. Situations in which the benefactor can provide
post-disaster relief but cannot condition that relief on the pre-disaster
behaviour of the beneficiary are a special case of a much more
general situation known as hidden action, or moral hazard (Arrow ;
Hölmstrom ). In the context of disaster risk, the beneficiary has
fewer incentives to invest in self-protection, such as strengthening build-
ings against natural hazards such as earthquakes, limiting develop-
ment to low-risk areas, shifting to economic activities that are more
resilient, or purchasing insurance themselves (Kaplow ). This
finding is sometimes referred to as a type of Samaritan’s Dilemma
(Buchanan ; Lindbeck and Weibull ; Coate ) or more
recently as a Charity Hazard (Browne and Hoyt ; Raschky and
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Weck-Hannemann ). Cohen and Werker () offer a political-
economy version, applying it to case studies of disaster relief.
A large empirical literature confirms this prediction more rigor-
ously for both the general case and national disaster-relief programs.
For example, Kousky et al. () consider floods in the United States
and estimate that for every US$ increase in average relief investment,
self-protection in the form of insurance decreases by approximately
US$. Van Asseldonk et al. () found that Dutch farmers who
believed government assistance would be available in the event of a
disaster had a significantly lower demand for crop insurance.
Meanwhile, political scientists have offered a variety of explanations
for underspending on disaster preparedness and overspending on
disaster relief by national governments. First, voters may show a
preference for private goods, such as direct relief payments, over public
goods, such as investments in early warning systems or better building
codes and zoning. Second, voters may simply be less aware of the benefits
of disaster preparedness expenditures relative to disaster relief expenditures
because of their lower relevance to them and the reduced media
coverage. Third, voters may make attribution errors by attributing
investments in preparedness expenditures to future government
administrations, whereas they are more likely to attribute relief
expenditures to the current administration. This attribution error
reduces politicians’ incentives to make long-term investments in risk
reduction. Fourth, voters may find it difficult to quantify the benefits
from investments in risk reduction, and in particular to construct
counterfactuals for how much larger the loss would have been after a
disaster without risk-reduction investments. Without such a compari-
son, they may underappreciate disaster preparedness expenditures.
Finally, voters may be shortsighted and underappreciate long-term
investments in risk reduction that do not yield large short-term pay-
offs. Healy and Malhotra () analysed these five potential mech-
anisms using a data set on natural disasters, U.S. government
spending, and election returns, and found that the first mechanism,
the desire for individually targeted goods over public goods, went a
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long way towards providing a useful explanation for the behaviour of
US politicians. They also estimated that federal investments in pre-
paredness are extremely cost-effective, with every US$ spent on
preparedness leading to a reduction in damage of approximately $.
Beyond Healy and Malhotra (), there is a wide range of evidence
that disaster relief buys votes. For example, using data on rainfall, public
relief spending, and elections from India, Cole et al. () found that
voters punish the incumbent party for weather events beyond its
control, but they punish the incumbent party less when it vigorously
responds to an event. This effect, however, is limited to election years.
Correspondingly, the authors find that the government spends more on
relief in election years. Reeves () demonstrates that in the United
States between  and  a single presidential disaster declaration
to specific constituencies translated on average into a one-point
increase in votes for the presidential party in a state-wide contest.
Furthermore, when the president rejects a governor’s request for federal
assistance, the president is punished in voting, whereas the governor is
rewarded (Gasper and Reeves ). Fuchs and Rodriguez-Chamussy
() analysed the impact of insurance payouts on voter behaviour in
the  Mexican presidential election. In this study, the incumbent
party was estimated to have garnered  per cent more votes where
payments were made prior to the election. Eisensee and Strömberg
() explain US disaster relief payments by media coverage, show-
ing that when a disaster occurs simultaneously with other news-
worthy events such as the Olympic Games, post-disaster aid is
reduced because media coverage of the disaster is crowded out by
the other events.
Although there are probably a large variety of reasons behind
delays in the provision of disaster relief, one reason may be the
strategic behaviour of benefactors. It is well understood that strategic
situations in which multiple parties could voluntarily contribute to
achieving a common goal—in this case the provision of relief to
disaster victims by multiple potential benefactors—often lead to the
observance of strategic delays (Osborne and Rubinstein ). Some
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convincing evidence of the cost of such delays has been uncovered.
For example, looking at extreme droughts, Alderman et al. ()
investigated the impact of preschool malnutrition on subsequent
human-capital formation in rural Zimbabwe. The authors estimated
that reduced nutrition in children under  may lead to a loss of  per
cent of lifetime earnings. Using Ethiopian data, Dercon () esti-
mated the effects of rainfall on consumption growth. He found that, as
a result of reduced consumption and increased distress sales, house-
hold income at the end of the nine-year study period was  per cent
lower than that of households that had not suffered to the same
degree. Clarke and Hill () used these two studies to estimate that
responding early in an extreme slow-onset drought would have been
approximately three times more cost-effective than responding late.
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Homer, the great Greek poet, wrote several millennia ago aboutOdysseus and his adventures. One of the most famous passages
of the Odyssey illustrates the virtue of a sensible plan and the need to
commit beforehand when difficult times are ahead. In this passage, his
hero’s sea travels take him and his ship’s crew close to the Sirenusian
islands, the home of the Sirens, whose songs were so irresistibly
seductive that seamen felt compelled to steer their ships towards the
Sirens and the islands’ rocks, and so met their doom. As his ship
approached the islands, Odysseus instructed his crew (who had their
ears plugged with beeswax) to tie him to the mast so he could hear the
Sirens’ song but resist its call. He also ordered his crew to ignore his
pleas to be released. That turned out to be a good decision. When
Odysseus heard the Sirens’ song, he lost his mind and tried to break
free, which would have meant his death. By sticking with his original
plan, he survived.
Politicians see things a bit differently; they prefer discretion over
rules—they hardly want to be tied to the mast. Political leadership is
about making decisions, or about being perceived to be making
decisions. The prevalent national and international funding model
for a disaster response gives politicians plenty of opportunities: lead-
ers can turn into benefactors, filling noisily presented begging bowls
and spending the revenue at their discretion.
And, as was shown in Chapter , the evidence suggests that it pays
politically to adopt this behaviour in both rich and poor countries. It
is hard to believe, then, that politicians would want to give up this
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discretion. And yet in this book we are asking them to do just that to
some extent because we want responses to disasters to be faster, more
effective, and better coordinated, with less waste of lives and money.
We argue that there are funding models that will make this possible,
with pre-committed finance, not appeals. And for this, we want them
to learn fromOdysseus and be willing to commit to a plan, well before
troubled times, and stick to it in their actions.
Why a plan? Because making better financing of disaster recovery
possible requires knowing what has to be financed. So a sensible plan
is needed: one that spells out what the risks are and who owns the
risks, and clarifies the responsibility of local governments, the
national government, international organizations, as well as families
and firms themselves both during a crisis and during the recovery
phase. It must be clearly stated who needs to do what to reduce the
risks beforehand and how that will be enforced. Such a plan must
appear reasonable and something that can actually be implemented. It
must be general enough to be useful in a broad range of circum-
stances and yet specific enough to be credible. One condition for
credibility is that the plan be underwritten—a realistic financing plan
must be in place beforehand. And the financing of plans is only
possible if there is a commitment to implementing the plan. It has
to be a good plan, but just like in the Odyssey it needs a means of
committing leaders to it.
The Politics of Credible Pre-Disaster Plans
Going down this route is not easy for politicians. Why be bound by
plans and give up discretion? Why give up being a benefactor, not
least because research has shown that the one who offers relief and
support after disasters enjoys greater political clout? Even if much of
the preparation is carried out beforehand, a disaster could unravel
every carefully designed plan. In the highly charged political environ-
ment following a disaster, a plan is typically not sacrosanct—plenty of
Sirens are making themselves heard. The plan then becomes just one
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of many inputs into a long, drawn-out negotiation among national
and local governments, donors, business, and citizens over who will
pay for what, when, and how.
There were plans in place when Hurricane Katrina reached New
Orleans in , but when the time came to implement them,
the plans proved to be lacking shared commitments.1 In the case of
the  Nepal earthquake, there was preparedness planning, but once
the earthquake struck, logistical arrangements to get supplies in
proved hard, while political disagreements slowed down responses.2
Coordination was a challenge, and it reportedly took many months to
reach a local political agreement on how to start allocating recon-
struction funding.3 If everybody knows a plan will be totally rewritten,
then planning becomes a box-ticking bureaucratic exercise to ensure
that there is something on paper in case anybody asks, even if every-
body knows it carries no weight. What is required are plans that
national and local politicians will commit to beforehand without
risk of reneging afterwards.
The problem does not lie solely with national politicians. Inter-
national humanitarian responses are based on need and need alone, an
excellent moral principle, but one that tends to lead to responses
based on plans prepared after a crisis has begun in which post-disaster
needs are examined. Too often, much time is wasted by needs assess-
ments and the slow negotiations among humanitarian and develop-
ment organizations and with government over what the post-disaster
need really is and what can be done. All the while the need is
increasing, with people waiting, hungry, and homeless, and watching
their jobs disappear. These types of plan prepared after disasters are
not discussed here. Rather, we focus on planning for possible crises that
will allow responses to become more predictable and to be financed
beforehand.
In considering the type of planning described here, benefactors—
governments, politicians, and humanitarian organizations—might
give some thought to the costs of not planning. The absence of a
plan and a serious commitment to act on it means there is little
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incentive to prepare for a disaster, resulting in a limited ability to
respond quickly and not much urgency to invest beforehand in
recovery and preparedness. And with limited planning, the immediate
humanitarian response will lack coordination and effectiveness.
Nurses, doctors, local officials, soldiers, and volunteers will devote
all their energy to helping, but commitment alone cannot overcome
operational failures. The costs of late responses are hard to quantify,
but studies have suggested that half the caseload could have been
avoided—equivalent to thousands of lives saved—if the Ebola
response had arrived one month earlier.4 And an early response to
an Ethiopian drought would cost only a third of a full-fledged later
response with the same impact.5 Failures in response and recovery will
ultimately also have a political cost.
So one needs to be able to offer an informed deal to those respon-
sible across the world—locally, nationally, and internationally—to pre-
commit to certain actions and responsibilities. One could think of it as
an Odyssean pact, an agreement that binds all parties into the future to
act in particular ways and avoids any discretion, despite its lure, to drop
a plan when a disaster strikes. Benefactors should embrace ways to
make big, showy pre-disaster promises and then tie themselves to the
mast to ensure they deliver on what they have promised and stay far
enough away from begging bowls and any over-involvement in post-
disaster largesse. Benefactors could aim for pre-disaster political spoils
and then post-disaster newspaper headlines that applaud a recovery
planning system that works, a government and international commu-
nity that have delivered on their promises—not headlines that
announce new, ad-hoc post-disaster initiatives that do not add up.
But, like Odysseus, it is up to benefactors to choose whether they
want to be tied up. This is an important political choice—not just a
technical issue. To be willing to be tied up and move from begging-
bowl financing to credible pre-disaster planning, benefactors will need
to benefit politically from this move. And for it to be politically
attractive, the recovery plan in question must be well prepared, feas-
ible, and credible.
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So how can benefactors extract pre-disaster spoils from credible
pre-disaster plans? For one thing, they might recognize that many
benefactors across the world, from governments to donors, are mov-
ing away from begging bowls. But how are they managing to sell this
to their constituents, and why are some not managing to? The details
vary, of course, from context to context, but what seems clear is that
politically sellable solutions require a lot of collaborative preparatory
work behind the scenes by men and women with at least four types of
professional background.
The Scientists
Over the last few decades, scientists have made much progress in
studying all kinds of hazards, such as extreme weather events and
volcanic or seismic activity. Earthquakes are still largely not forecast,
but volcanic eruptions can be forecast weeks in advance. Extreme
weather events such as hurricanes and typhoons are increasingly
being predicted some days or even a week ahead, offering valuable
time to prepare. Slow-onset disasters such as droughts offer longer
lead times because their impacts are felt months after the onset when
harvests have to be collected or wells dry up. Monitoring of ocean
temperatures, especially when the Pacific becomes exceptionally
warm resulting in the disruptive force of the El Niño weather phe-
nomenon, has allowed even earlier forecasts of possible droughts or
floods. Early warning is in general something that will allow better
responses to such events, even though early warning does not neces-
sarily lead to early action.
This scientific progress feeds the pre-disaster planning process in a
more fundamental way as well. Increasingly, scientists are able to offer
more insight into what kinds of disaster could occur and with what
likelihood. For example, an earthquake or extreme tropical cyclone
may not have been seen in a century, but if it poses a very real
catastrophic threat then the likelihood and potential impact need to
be understood. Where the spread of exposed buildings or population
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increases the potential economic destruction that could be wreaked by
an unfortunately placed disaster, this need is even stronger. Hazards
are increasing because of climate change, and pandemics may be more
of a threat in particular populations in densely populated areas.
Working across a vast array of disciplines, scientists have begun to
develop risk models that offer a detailed understanding of how much
damage or loss of life would be inflicted by various natural disasters
and pandemics. This progress in modelling extreme events and their
consequences has stemmed from thought experiments, careful obser-
vation, study of history, and advanced statistical analysis of data on the
natural environment as well as economic, demographic, and social
data. The resulting probabilistic models of natural-disaster events and
pandemics and their consequences can help everyone understand
what sorts of event could lead to disasters and need to be included
in recovery plans.
Scientists have a further important role to play by laying out the
odds of various events and scenarios and encouraging all to think
carefully about them. For example, models could have predicted that
an earthquake on the scale of the one that struck Nepal in  or a
pandemic that spirals out of control such as the Ebola virus that
invaded West Africa in  would have a reasonable probability of
leading to large loss of life and economic damage. In playing that role,
scientists can help to overcome decision-making behaviour more akin
to that of gamblers, which is the curse of sensible disaster prepared-
ness across all organizations. A gambler (and, let us be honest, many
of us) often thinks luck in a game of chance will turn in his or her
favour simply because there has been a particular series of bad
outcomes—that is, in a coin-toss surely heads will come after a series
of tails. However, this is a poor understanding of probability: the odds
of getting heads in the next coin toss is not changed because it was
preceded by a series of tails. The gambler’s fallacy is a cognitive bias in
which one tends to increase the perceived odds of events experienced
more recently rather than form an unbiased assessment of all the
risks.6 Just as in most organizations, firms, or families, in governments
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the focus is often on the response to the previous disaster. The result is
then perfect plans for recent past disasters and very poor plans for all
the possible disasters that have a reasonable likelihood of happening.
Without scientists, one might expect a lot of plans across the world
on how to deal with Ebola in West Africa and earthquakes in Nepal,
whereas other infectious diseases or earthquakes may have very
different patterns and impacts. This is a real and very visible risk at
present: without scientists there will be an imbalance in what coun-
tries plan for.
That said, scientific knowledge alone is not enough. Communica-
tion of scientific findings at all levels of society is critical. If people do
not understand the disaster risks to which they are exposed, being
protected is not valued, and spending money on credible pre-disaster
planning is not a vote-winner. Scientists need to help political leaders
communicate clearly the risks faced and why investments should be
made in reducing risks and responding better. Fixing this through
visible, awareness-raising investments may support moves away from
the begging bowl. This is easiest where local disasters are frequent and
the threat of a natural disaster is part of the national psyche, as is the
case for all of the countries we feature in this book.
The Bureaucrats
The central task of the women and men who work in national
governments and international organizations tasked with disaster
management is to undertake the preparation needed for a disaster
response: to prepare policy that politicians may want to take forward,
prepare a response plan, and prepare for recovery after a disaster.
Drafting endless documents that lay all this out comes naturally to
these officials—we know, we are two of them. But for the recovery
plan proposed here, more is needed from bureaucrats: they need to be
politically astute. Planning for a disaster is a political choice—not
merely a technical exercise. Without something for their political
masters to sell, there are no upfront political gains from credible
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planning, and so plans will not be pre-financed, let alone implemented.
A technically sensible plan without political support or a budget is just a
piece of paper.
Pulling Together the Parties
The main political decision to be made by all organizations with a
stake in disasters is who will own what risk—that is, who will
respond, how will they respond, and who will be responsible for
paying what when a disaster occurs. National governments may
claim they bear all the risks in their country; international organiza-
tions may claim they will respond on the basis of need and need alone.
It is up to the officials in national governments and international
organizations to turn these aspirations into affordable, implementable
plans, with political backing. They can then help benefactors navigate
the explicit political decisions to be made beforehand.
In fact, there are plenty of these kinds of decision. For example,
in dealing with the economic damage after an earthquake or flood,
should the national government protect all public infrastructure or
only infrastructure owned by the national government? Will the
national government contribute at all to the cost of protecting infra-
structure owned by subnational governments? What happens when a
subnational government will not pay its share—will the national
government still pay its share? Will the national government contrib-
ute towards the cost of protecting low-income housing or agricultural
production from disasters? Will homeowners or farmers have to pay
for their share of protection to benefit from the government’s contri-
bution to protection? Who will be enrolled in a social safety net? Will
there be targeting by community or by type of family? What can the
ministry of finance actually afford? Will there be a focus on particular
geographical areas or sectors of the economy? Of course, technical
and financial analysis should inform these trade-offs, but ultimately
they are political decisions.
Decisions also have to be made about the response to a public-
health emergency in a poor country. Will the national government
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take charge and deal with the problem via the government-controlled
health sector, or will it bring in private and charitable providers?
Will government provide these other providers with resources?
What will be the role of local governments versus the national gov-
ernment, and how will this role be financed? What will be the role of
non-governmental organizations (NGOs)? Under what circumstances
and conditions will the government call in the help of specialized
international aid agencies? Will it hire more staff, and under what
conditions? Will it compensate for economic losses from public-
health measures? What is the role of the health ministry, the local
communities ministry, and the ministry of finance, or indeed the
presidency?
This decision making becomes even more challenging when more
than one party is involved in financing or implementing a disaster
response, because nobody likes to be coordinated. Given the econ-
omies of scale in financing and logistics, it is far, far better to have one
well-coordinated plan than a large number of fragmented plans. Yes,
there are substantial political and bureaucratic incentives to not work
together—but, as discussed in Chapter , there is also strong evidence
from evaluation of responses that not working together is costly for
those exposed to disasters. A good plan should benefit from econ-
omies of scale in finance and logistics, and achieving this begins with
the political and bureaucratic leadership. There has to be one joint
political choice that all stakeholders are willing to buy into.
Having negotiations before a disaster over who will pay for what
and who will do what is unlikely to be any easier than having the same
negotiations after a disaster. However, postponement of hard choices
only leads to strategic bargaining and costly delays after a disaster
strikes. Before a disaster happens, there is a serious collective-action
problem: many of the parties have little incentive to come to agree-
ments in good time. Overcoming this collective-action problem is
crucial to avoiding the serious coordination failures after the onset
of a disaster. Therefore, astute officials are needed to steer all to
negotiate and agree on good plans.
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A good starting point for pre-disaster negotiation between parties is
usually to think through who would be likely to do what in the event
of a disaster—or who did what for a recent disaster. It may also be
helpful to interview key informants to find out what each benefactor
and each political constituency believe other benefactors would or
should do in the aftermath of different kinds of disaster. For example,
one might ask farmers, agribusiness leaders, other citizens, and civil
servants in national and subnational agriculture and the finance min-
istry what they think government would do in the event of a cata-
strophic drought. One might also bring together nurses, doctors,
community leaders, police officers, the military, ordinary citizens,
NGO leaders, and different ministries to understand who they think
would and should respond in a public-health emergency and how. In
countries that plan well, the answers should be broadly consistent—
citizens and subnational governments should know what they will be
entitled to and benefactors should know what they are contributing
to, but all too often these conversations do not take place or only with
empty commitments and few consequences. It is, nevertheless, a
crucial part of the process: without a clear factual understanding of
who will do what and when, no sensible planning can take place. In
countries that expect or have a history of outside support when
disasters loom, it is critical to bring those outsiders into this pre-
disaster negotiation.
Drawing Up the Plan
Skill in crafting a political statement is conducive to good planning.
Many political statements about disaster risks undermine sensible
planning. They focus on the inputs—that is, the people and resources
one can mobilize, such as the contingency fund, officials, army, or
some civil defence force; the vehicles and trucks available; the com-
mand and control structures needed to deploy them; the health
services that can be on standby; and the supplies that can be requisi-
tioned. This is a very natural way to plan, but by itself it tends not to
work very well. Announcing what inputs they have at their disposal
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does not help bureaucrats know when to deploy them, how to target
them, how to utilize them for disasters of different severities, or what
to do for really big disasters when additional inputs are needed.
It is far better to start from outcomes, not inputs. This is the essence of
being fully upfront about the ownership of the risks. Being clear about
who and what needs to be protected—lives, health, livelihoods, assets,
and infrastructure—gives financiers and implementers the space to
arrange the logistics and structure the financing to achieve the outcomes.
A good plan, then, will be defined in a clear, public, joint declaration
by all the relevant stakeholders who might contribute to post-disaster
financing or implementation. The declaration will state who or what
will be protected, against what, what (if any) conditions there will be
for protection, how the protection will be implemented, and who will
pay for what. Only after these aspects of the plan have been defined
should the administrative, logistics, and financial specialists be
brought in to fill in the technical details of the plan to achieve the
stated outcomes.
Making it unambiguously clear who is responsible for what means
clarifying what risks the national or local government will take on,
and what risk have to be shared with households and firms. For
example, a government has to state unequivocally whether it will
cover all farmers if harvests fail, or just particular ones, and whether
it expects others to insure themselves or cover their losses directly.
A donor or multilateral agency may state outright that it will cover a
particular share of the costs of scaling up a safety net; it may also
declare that it will step in logistically if a national government obvi-
ously cannot handle a disaster. A global health organization may
commit to deploy immediately if a particular infectious disease
appears, or it may commit to enter to support the national govern-
ment if after a specified number of days that disease is still spreading.
A good joint plan could start by declaring that the national and
subnational governments will pay equal shares of the cost of reconstruc-
tion of subnational infrastructure damaged by a natural disaster, that
reconstruction will ‘build back better’ to pre-agreed disaster-resilient
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 31/3/2016, SPi
B R I N G I N T H E P R O F E S S I O N A L S

building standards,7 and that infrastructure will have to be registered
to be eligible for the protection. Or a plan could declare that govern-
ment and donors will use targeted cash transfers to jointly protect all
households registered as living in a given area against drought-
induced food insecurity (which the Hunger Safety Net Programme
does in Kenya).
The Implementers
All this talk of science and planning may well drive those who work
on the ground during crises to distraction. Heroic work is undertaken
by all kinds of frontline workers during disasters: nurses, doctors, and
community health workers; soldiers and civil defence workers; local
officials and community leaders; staff from national and international
NGOs; field staff of governments, donors, and international aid agen-
cies; and vast armies of volunteers. Without their support and confi-
dence, no plan can be implemented following a disaster.
As frontline workers, they are in the middle of the action when the
suffering is at its worst, doing good where they can, driven by super-
human energy, adrenaline, and moral commitment. They are crucial
because they work with the people affected and listen to them. They
are also the relayers of the bad news—of late response, poor coord-
ination, and under-resourcing. The bureaucrats had better invite them
in early on, as without their hard work but also their buy-in the best-
written plan is just empty words.
The knowledge and experience of the implementers are central to
understanding what can be done sensibly and in what order in the
aftermath of a disaster. What relief will be needed in the weeks
following the crisis? How will the reconstruction of lifeline infrastruc-
ture such as key bridges and hospitals work over the followingmonths?
And how should any subsequent reconstruction be sequenced? Any
small or big plan should be tested by these implementers, including in
practical exercises. How would it work? What are its strengths and
weaknesses? How can it be improved?
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During the drafting stages of plans, frontline workers will probably
argue for adaptability and flexibility when circumstances change: a
good plan will be clear on how it will evolve and change if required.
They may also recommend decentralization so that decision making
about support is carried out near the people in need. But evaluations
and experience have also shown that simply leaving it to those on the
ground to act as they see fit during crises does not necessarily lead to
the best outcomes. Fragmentation and lack of coordination bedevil
responses, as was discussed in Chapter . It is crucial, then, to settle
beforehand on sensible plans and coordination mechanisms.
Finally, implementers can contribute significantly to improving
response planning. There continues to be remarkably little evidence
on the cost-effectiveness of the various response models in humani-
tarian support. During a drought or flood that has deprived people of
their livelihoods, should one support families or target particular
individuals? Should one focus on income support or targeted nutri-
tion? One problem is that there are very few high-quality evaluations
of humanitarian interventions in which hard data are collected early
on in order to learn lessons for other crises.8 Implementers can assist
those trying to improve this situation, despite the difficulties of carry-
ing out quality impact evaluations during the extreme circumstances
of a disaster response.9
The Financiers
Finally, the financiers need to be invited to join the three other groups
in the room. The men and women of finance are needed to work out
how much different contingency plans would cost and to lock in
agreements, so that the political agreement to a plan is tied to a
credible commitment to finance the plan.
Trade-offs are always necessary when deciding who to protect and
against what, and understanding the financial consequences of differ-
ent plans for different potential disasters, the contingent liability, is
critical. Actuaries and other financial types can use market-implied
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 31/3/2016, SPi
B R I N G I N T H E P R O F E S S I O N A L S

pricing techniques, now ubiquitous within insurance companies, to
determine how much it will cost on average to finance a given
contingent liability and therefore to implement a particular plan.
These cost figures can support a virtuous circle between defining
and refining the policy objectives, updating the plan, and estimating
the cost of implementing the plan.
But putting a cost on potential political choices is not the only area
in which financiers add value. Their real usefulness comes in making
sure that promises are credible and will be kept. Political constituen-
cies will need to know who will be protected once a disaster strikes
and how, and for this to happen plans need to be locked down
beforehand. It turns out that this takes quite a bit of subtle work
behind the scenes.
According to contract theory in economics, merely having a con-
tract is not enough unless its enforcement is beyond doubt: it has to be
credible and designed so that no one can benefit by opting out of the
agreement later and doing their own thing. Behavioural scientists
point out that even if commitments are genuine and sensible, com-
mitment devices (such as the mast to which Odysseus was tied) are
required to ensure that commitments are actually kept, to avoid
procrastination, and to make action as intended credible. The finan-
ciers should be on hand to tie Odysseus to the mast and to ensure that
the other sailors do not respond to his call to be released when the
Sirens call.
In practice, these solutions typically centre on financial contracts
and budgetary mechanisms that are arranged before a disaster strikes
to lock in the plan.10 Done well, financial planning for disasters is not
just about making sure that the money is available when it is needed; it
is also the glue that holds all the pieces of the plan together and makes
it credible (see Chapter ). It ensures that funds are available quickly
when—and only when—they are required by the plan, and it binds
the various partners to pre-agreed objectives, decision processes, and
implementation modalities to make the plan strong enough to with-
stand the whirlwind of highly charged post-disaster politics.
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Avoiding Hot Air and Getting Results
Credible pre-disaster planning requires a lot of joint technical work
from a variety of professionals. Without the scientists generating
knowledge and the science communicators communicating it, nobody
knows or cares about what disasters need to be planned for. Without
the subtle manoeuvring of bureaucrats and officials to broker the
different scenarios about who will have to bear what risk, coordinated
declarations will not be politically attractive and plans will not be
sustainably funded. Without the implementers and their critical voices,
but also their commitment to certain actions and not others, contin-
gency plans will not be sensible or logistically feasible. And without
financiers able to apply know-how from insurance, declarations will
just be hot air and serious planning will begin only after a disaster. This
typically means coordination between government ministries and
the full range of international development partners and multilateral
institutions.
Tossing out the begging bowl and moving to credible pre-disaster
planning requires all four types of professional working together,
appreciating their place in the process, and delivering on their core
responsibility. And it requires benefactors who are open to the idea of
moving away from the old ways of doing things (see Chapter ).
Given all this, it is perhaps unsurprising that the best disaster
response systems are in countries where some of the professionals
have an easy time. For example, Mexico issues about thirty disaster
declarations every year, and empty promises from politicians about
disaster responses are quite quickly shown for what they are. Voters
have a pretty good understanding of disaster risk. International donors
are not involved, and so the main issue is the coordination between
the federal and state governments, and this has been tackled head on
by the federal government, which became tired of being presented
with thirty begging bowls a year by state governments. Research
indicates that having reliable, timely access to post-disaster funding
channelled through Mexico’s FONDEN between  and  led to
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an increase in local economic activity between  and  per cent over
the first year after a disaster—a big benefit.11
Embracing Pre-Disaster Planning
As soon as governments and their partners change their mindset,
place themselves beyond the reach of the begging bowls, and opt for
pre-disaster plans, planning starts making sense. Once the matching
financial plans are on the table, it becomes really interesting. It is the
time for some real political leadership, nationally and internationally,
because the crucial endgame is nigh.
Plans cease to be beautiful fiction, based on an assumption of
unlimited budgets and imaginary implementation capacity, and
instead the process of planning forces governments and the inter-
national community to think through important political trade-offs
before a disaster strikes. What or who can the ministry of finance
actually afford to protect? If the implementation capability will be
constrained (a city cannot be rebuilt in a day), how should the
response be sequenced after a disaster? Should a government invest
now in standby reconstruction capacity for rebuilding public struc-
tures, or register vulnerable people and their bank accounts so that
cash transfers can be made quickly should a disaster strike? Should a
government protect against only the really extreme disasters that are
catastrophic at the national level, or also against the smaller, more
localized disasters that can still devastate communities? Who should
really be paying for their own protection, or at least contributing
towards it? How much is the international community really able to
contribute and for what? How will money flow to where the plan
demands it—will it be routed through government or NGOs? What
pre-disaster promises of protection are politically sellable (both in the
country and to contributors to the humanitarian system) and afford-
able? Making these trade-offs is not easy, but the current system
implicitly makes them, albeit hidden behind a lot of post-disaster
razzle-dazzle, coordination failures, and delays.
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Perhaps most importantly, credible pre-disaster financial planning
can help to unblock chronic underinvestment in risk reduction. There
are lots of reasons why municipal governments may underinvest in
strengthening buildings, farmers may underinvest in new, more resili-
ent crops or in drought- or flood-resistant seeds, and developers
may build cities on earthquake fault lines. One reason may be that
people believe—rightly or wrongly—that they will be bailed out when
disaster strikes. Why should they then invest in risk reduction? Of
course, one can blame the beneficiaries, but this is not a useful recipe
for a solution. Solving this problem lies in reforming the role of the
benefactor.
Benefactors can do more to promote sensible investments in risk
reduction through a credible pre-disaster system of protection than
through a discretionary begging-bowl system. For example, national
governments can commit to contributing to the protection of muni-
cipal buildings, but only those that have undergone some minimum
level of strengthening. Governments can subsidize the cost of insur-
ance for farmers, but only for newer, more resilient crops or for
farmers economizing on water use. Governments and donors can
provide partial subsidies for homeowner earthquake insurance so
that such insurance is affordable for all existing homes. For a new
home built in a risky place, however, the cost of insurance will be
commensurately greater. All of these approaches would encourage
the beneficiary to invest in risk reduction.
Credible pre-disaster financing can also promote sensible invest-
ments by benefactors themselves in risk reduction. If a benefactor has
‘owned up’ to its contingent liability on its balance sheet, and if
someone has a brilliant idea for how to invest now to reduce the
cost of bearing that risk, the benefactor may be more willing to
contribute some of its own money than if it was off balance sheet.
For example, when national and subnational governments jointly
agree on who is responsible for what reconstruction post-disaster,
both are more inclined to invest in risk reduction. When governments
and farmers agree to pay jointly for the cost of agricultural insurance,
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both have in interest in investing in climate-smart, resilient agriculture
to reduce the insurance premium. The World Bank offers middle-
income countries a line of credit, the Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown
Option (Cat DDO), which can be drawn down by a national govern-
ment within a day or two of a disaster resulting from a natural event.
However, this programme is only available if a government makes
specific policy reforms that enable or promote improved risk man-
agement in advance.
How to ensure that a plan is credible so that it will be implemented
when a disaster hits is discussed in Chapters  and . But will politi-
cians decide to trust the professionals and buy into the plan? Why
should they? They know that being a benefactor and acting after a
disaster strikes pays—the evidence tells them that approach is bene-
ficial. So why trust a group of professionals and a plan? The best
argument is that the evidence clearly indicates it is the best thing to do
for people and countries when extreme events risk turning into
disasters. Pre-disaster planning, when done carefully, would result in
faster, more effective responses, and so can help avoid the kind of
losses to people and economies documented in Chapter .
How convincing will all this be to politicians? Doing as we suggest
will not lead to tangible outcomes because it is about economic losses
avoided, about lives not lost or harmed. It is not about visibly rescuing
people or about openly responding to petitions of support by local
communities and authorities. Putting trust in pre-disaster planning
may not lead to photo opportunities, to flag planting, or to patronage
for the supporters of politicians, let alone electoral success—the
evidence suggests it is unlikely to help with that. And, no doubt,
there will be a class of politicians who will not want to budge if this
is the price to be paid. Others will do it because the evidence tells them
it is for the best for their country’s citizens. In the end, then, pre-
disaster planning is a political choice that politicians need to make,
even if it ties their hands and even if it does not lead to tangible results
they can exploit. And that is why politicians will have to act as leaders,
doing what is best for their country’s citizens and economy.
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Recapping . . .
. Good planning is based on an iterative dialogue among scientists,
bureaucrats, implementers, and financiers about what or who is to
be protected, how, and howmuch it will cost. Bad planning happens
when at least one of these parties is missing from the dialogue.
. Planning is a political choice; it is not just a technical exercise.
A good plan will include a clear political statement before a disaster
about who or what is to be protected, against what, what the
conditions for protection are, and who will pay for the protection.
. Political statements by governments or development partners
about how much money would be made available or how many
people would be mobilized in the event of a disaster are not
conducive to good planning. Useful political statements focus on
target outcomes and leave the details on the ‘how’ to be worked
out by the implementing agencies and financiers.
. Benefactors who want to maximize the development impact of
their support should think through different natural disaster
scenarios, assess what support they would provide in each
scenario, and own up to this contingent liability when in
discussions with other partners. A benefactor with either no
contingency plan or its own stand-alone contingency plan will fall
short in its efforts to help people.
. Behavioural biases against good planning are strongest for the
kinds of disaster that did not occur in the recent past—that is, for
nearly all future disasters. To combat these biases, there is a
particular need to invest in science-based risk information and
clear communication of this information to ensure that everyone
knows for which contingencies they need protection.
A Snapshot of the Literature
Credibly establishing risk ownership requires overcoming the pre-
disaster collective-action problem in order to avoid serious post-disaster
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coordination failures. Clear risk ownership is a basic tenet of sound risk
management (World Bank b). It is recognized as a fundamental
principle of enterprise risk management (Nocco and Stulz ; Lam
) and is widely acknowledged as important for sound disaster risk
management (UNISDR ; World Bank a), including pandemic
risk management (WHO ). The need for cross-disciplinary team-
work for complex but effective resilience-building solutions is also well
understood (World Bank ).
Hsiang and Narita () analyse the deaths and damages arising
from tropical cyclones worldwide for the period – and find
that countries with more frequent tropical cyclones suffer lower losses
from similar events, suggesting that adaptation and risk reduction are
more successful in these countries. Ley-Borrás and Fox () have
compiled an overview of the generation and uses of disaster risk
information for financial protection solutions.
In the literature on humanitarian relief networks, Stephenson
() presents an overview of the issues, challenges, and possible
solutions related to post-disaster humanitarian assistance. In particu-
lar, Stephenson argues that effective coordination among aid agencies
is hampered by competition for clients, disparate organizational struc-
tures, the need to attract media attention, and the costliness of coord-
ination efforts. He suggests changing their organizational cultures to
encourage operational coordination. Janssen et al. () and Bharosa
et al. () find that relief workers are often more concerned with
receiving information from others than giving information to others
who may benefit, and that understanding each other’s work processes
is crucial to improving coordination. In a similar spirit, Kapucu ()
argues that in order to ensure effective communication at the time of a
disaster, organizations should establish inter-agency communication
before disasters strike.
There is a rich literature on emergency logistics, including pre-
disaster operations such as evacuation, facility placement, and stock
pre-positioning, and post-disaster operations such as relief distribu-
tions and casualty transportation. The collection of essays in
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Christopher and Tatham () stresses the importance of sharing
information in order to put in place agile, synchronized supply net-
works. Van Wassenhove () calls for stronger partnerships between
the public and private sectors for managing post-disaster logistics.
Caunhye et al. () take a look at the literature on optimization
models in emergency logistics, and Zeimpekis et al. () provide an
overview of recent research results and future trends in operational
research for disaster relief.
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Changing the default setting
Ato Samual Mengisha speaks proudly about the Gebrale Iddir, thefuneral society of which he is the secretary, in the village of
Bukicho in the southern highlands of Ethiopia. The society was
founded about twenty years ago, and his family has been a member
ever since. Life is still hard for the families in this village, which is
dependent on rain-fed agriculture, growing enset (false banana), coffee,
and maize. In the area, funerals are expensive and rather too common.
Although conditions have definitely improved in recent years, more
than a third of the families are classified as not having enough
resources for their basic needs, and in a village like this, about one in
ten children does not survive past the age of . Just as everywhere
across the world, providing a decent burial for a deceased family
member is important. Relatives and friends are invited to share their
grief. Hospitality in the form of food and drink plays a big part in a
dignified burial. Community cohesion is such that relatives of the
deceased can rely on support from others in this time of need, but,
still, not being able to pay for a funeral when required is sad and
shameful.
This iddir has fifty-four members. Every year, members pay a mem-
bership fee of about US$, either in instalments or in one go; new
members pay an entry fee of $ as well. When a member or the spouse
of a member dies, the society pays out $ to the family in cash—a
smaller sum if another close relative dies. Contributions are
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predictable, and so members can plan carefully to ensure they have
the cash rather than being surprised when a sudden death requires
extra cash. Ways to raise extra emergency cash—again before the pot
is empty—are specified. At the time of the conversation with Ato
Samual, the iddir had cash reserves of about $. It also owned a
canvas tent, plates, and glasses worth about $, which members
brought along to a funeral.
Ethiopia has tens of thousands of iddirs that operate like this.
Typically, they have fewer than  members. Probably originating
in the Gurage communities, the iddir model can now be found across
Ethiopia, even in urban areas and among civil servants, teachers, and
World Bank employees in their Addis Ababa office. Contributions
vary, but everywhere the rules are very similar. Membership is select-
ive, and an entry fee is payable. A group usually holds the reserves in
cash or buys some assets. Iddirs are considered an essential part of
the Ethiopian cultural fabric. Many of these funeral societies in Ethi-
opia are expanding to take on other risks such livestock death or
illness. Essentially, they can be thought of as mutual societies, histor-
ically at the root of some of the largest insurance companies in
the world.1
As noted in Chapter , similar groups can be found elsewhere—for
example, in India, Tanzania, and South Africa.2 They offer a sensible
solution to a problem. A delay in finding the resources for an uncer-
tain event such as a funeral is stressful and wastes time, and so
organizing financing beforehand is one part of the solution. It also
helps that the response by the group is well defined: a pre-determined
cash transfer plus some practical assistance to help with the funeral.
And the simple and clear decision rules for implementation help to
make it functional. In fact, this is small-scale risk management that
works for rich and poor alike: those wanting bigger funerals either set
up groups with higher fees and payouts, or, more commonly, join
multiple groups so they can receive multiple payouts to finance a
more expensive funeral.
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Meanwhile, there are no opportunities for procrastination, for
strategic behaviour, or for benefactor behaviour. In fact, iddirs have
group incentives to ensure that disasters are avoided—that is, for risk
reduction. Because they can force all members to attend meetings or
take part in specific activities as part of their membership, and because
it is in their collective interest to limit mortality, they are proving to be
excellent vehicles for spreading health education and other develop-
mental messages.
Why aren’t similar principles applied to managing disasters across
the world? Of course, the problems that arise when a sudden death
occurs in a village are far smaller than when a disaster strikes. Lots of
people are affected at the same time, and planning for large-scale
disasters and the decision making required for preparation and
responses are far more difficult. But some of the principles are very
similar, whether one is dealing with a community planning sensibly
for burial support or a national government or international organ-
ization preparing a credible response to a possible disaster.
The Flaws of Human Decision Making
At the heart of any credible pre-disaster plan is a system for post-
disaster decision making. Decision making is hard, even if the political
will is there. However, if the system for decision making is well thought
through, it will serve as a basis for a viable alternative to discretionary
begging-bowl financing. If it is not, it is back to the begging bowls.
In recent decades, research in psychology and behavioural econom-
ics has illuminated the flaws of human decision making, but also what
to do about them. Three related lessons from this behavioural science
research can help in the design of better decision-making systems to
cope with disasters. The first lesson is that people tend to place too
little value on the future; they have a bias towards the present day
instead. The result is that they are not inclined to act now for future
benefit, even if there is plenty of evidence of regret afterwards. An
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example is not saving enough for retirement—and, indeed, not pro-
tecting oneself against potential future harm.3 To overcome this bias,
people can use commitment devices to lock themselves into certain
actions. Odysseus understood that, and he found a way to pre-commit
to certain actions by tying himself to the mast and avoiding the song
of the Sirens. Poor Ethiopians have clearly found another way by
paying a regular contribution to a fund that can be used to pay for
funerals.4
The second lesson is that people tend not to change what they are
doing unless the incentive to do so is strong—the ‘status quo bias’.5
Inertia and procrastination go hand in hand with this bias: inaction
tends to be preferred over action. Businesses and governments have
begun to discover they can exploit this human tendency by making
the choice for clients or constituents (such as enrolment in a pension
scheme) and then forcing them to opt out if they disagree with that
choice. There is strong evidence that if action has to be taken to opt
out rather than opt in, enrolment in pension schemes increases
dramatically.6 In general, changes in the default setting has proved
to be an effective strategy for nudging people towards better out-
comes, and it is now recognized as one of the primary routes through
which behavioural science is informing public policy.7
The third lesson builds on the finding that people tend to have
limited information-processing capacities, which affects the quality of
their decision making, even when the stakes are high.8 Behavioural
scientists have suggested that much can be gained from keeping things
simple: ensure that plans and any decision making they entail are kept
as clear and simple as possible. Well-designed, intelligent decision
rules and triggers will make the difference.9 So for funerals, whereas
different people may have different financial needs, different mortality
risks, or different desires for simple or extravagant funerals, the iddirs
have only one fixed contribution for all members and one fixed
payout when a member dies. This is not necessarily the best possible
outcome for all members, but a simple, clear set of decision rules
allows this group to function and to function well.
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It Isn’t Rocket Science (or Is It?)
So, what does this mean for decision making around disasters? It
suggests the need for a clear-cut, straightforward disaster response
plan that can be easily implemented. Strong commitment devices
should be found to ensure that the tendency to resort to the default
setting of inaction is changed to one of action. Clear-cut triggers and
decision rules will aid decision making. It is not rocket science—in
fact, it is probably more difficult than that; it is about human behaviour,
not Newton’s laws, and there are far more unknowns. Any extreme
event that may lead to a disaster will happen in very specific circum-
stances involving many people whose actions and reactions are not
easily predicted. How then does one make effective decisions on
launching a successful response?
No one has either the time or the imagination to plan fully for
everything that would have to happen after any disaster, so some
post-disaster discretion will always be needed. The questions to be
answered here are these: What should be decided before a disaster, and
what should be decided afterwards? What should be on standby, ready
for take-off, at all times, and what can be decided later?
One option would be to prepare rough plans for the people or
buildings that will be protected in a disaster, how they will be pro-
tected, and who will pay for it. Then, after the disaster, a group of
experts, bureaucrats, or political leaders would quickly work out the
details of the response. The problem with this approach is that in a
highly charged post-disaster environment, there will be negotiation
over the details of how the money will flow and to whom, and there
will be procrastination while waiting for more information. All this will
take time. Strategic discretion is the enemy of speed, particularly after
a big disaster, and particularly in an environment rife with benefactors,
begging bowls, and bureaucracies. Around the world, there is no
shortage of pre-disaster plans laying out the principles for who is
supposed to make what decisions when, but again and again that
information does not lead to timely action—it just provides ammunition
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for long, drawn-out negotiations. It will not get the response off the
ground in time.
Instead of governments and their partners making approximate
commitments, roughly agreeing to everything that will happen in
the months after a disaster, they could take some lessons again from
the Gebrale Iddir. It does not offer a full response plan for everything
that happens after the death of a member. Rather, it provides precisely
defined support in cash and in kind under specific circumstances, with
all the financing sorted out beforehand. In general, it is more useful for
governments and their partners to make precise, focused commit-
ments to a credible set of minimal actions that pre-identified imple-
menters have the authority and financing to undertake immediately.
These actions would be financed and implemented based on pre-
agreed rules and triggers, without the need for any begging bowls or
any further green light from political masters. This precise, immediate
action plan would define what data would be collected on day one and
what financing and actions they would automatically trigger; what
data would be collected on day two and how they could accelerate or
decelerate actions, etc. The idea is similar to a launch sequence: over
time the data force a (minimal) sequence of actions taken in line with a
predefined timetable.
The plan could be as simple as providing fast cash or food transfers
to drought-affected people. Such a response would require some
investments beforehand in identifying the vulnerable households
and categorizing them by level of vulnerability, and it would require
agreeing beforehand to the rainfall patterns or satellite data that would
automatically trigger food or cash support to households. If a drought
is mild, perhaps only the most vulnerable households would receive
support, but for a more extreme drought support could automatically
be extended to less vulnerable households as well. Government or its
partners could always provide top-up support over and above this
minimal response on a discretionary basis, but the minimal response
would be planned for and financed in advance of any possible drought
and would happen automatically.
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Or the plan could simply apply to the reconstruction of
government-owned infrastructure following an earthquake. Before
any earthquake, the ‘ lifeline’ infrastructure (such as key roads, bridges,
or hospitals) could be identified and prioritized as part of the pre-disaster
plan, and the implementing agency responsible for post-disaster recon-
struction of this infrastructure would be identified. Immediately after an
earthquake of a given magnitude and epicentre, a pre-agreed budget
would automatically be made available to the implementing agency for
reconstruction of this lifeline infrastructure. The implementing agency
would be responsible for immediately launching reconstruction of the
lifeline infrastructure, using the initial budget and applying the pre-agreed
principles for prioritizing reconstruction to the specific details of the
earthquake.10
An earthquake could also trigger an additional budget for a detailed,
objective assessment of the full extent of the damage for all lifeline
infrastructure. Such an assessment would automatically unlock add-
itional budgetary funds if the initial automatic budget turned out to be
insufficient, so that all lifeline infrastructure is in full working order
within six months of any earthquake. Planning for a disaster might
also include provision for the implementing agency responsible for
post-disaster reconstruction to invest in reconstruction capabilities,
develop and implement procurement pre-qualification criteria, and
sign retainer agreements with construction companies to ensure that
the country has the capacity within the construction sector to respond
adequately to an earthquake.
This does not mean delegating all post-disaster decision making to
technical agencies and replacing all post-disaster discretion with pre-
agreed rules and objective triggers. We are merely proposing that a
credible, rules-based plan that everyone knows will be implemented
be in place, based on an agreement made before the disaster about
who or what will be protected, how the protection will work, and who
will pay.
In countries that have taken this approach, a concise, credible plan
changes the default setting for responding to disasters from ‘wait and
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see’ to ‘implement what is in the plan’. This approach may not be
perfect, but it sidesteps the delays and warped incentives of the
begging bowl. And if this immediate response plan is well constructed,
it will allow timely, sensible actions.
All Systems Go
A rocket launch sequence needs to culminate in take-off, and that is
possible with a precise countdown and a set of predefined systems
that ensures that all systems are go. In the same way, certain decision-
making and implementation systems need to be in place before a
disaster to ensure a response plan can be implemented.
A clear command and control system for strong leadership of the post-
disaster response is required for plan implementation. All too often,
poor coordination post-disaster hampers responses. Implementers
can provide helpful input on how command and control of imple-
mentation should work, and how, at the technical level, different
implementing agencies can work together towards common goals.
All parties should agree on a coordination system, and that can only
be done beforehand.
Information systems that can be scaled up quickly during crises are
essential to the implementation of response plans. They can then relay
information to the coordinators and allow plans to be adapted to
actual need. But this will only work and will not unravel carefully
prepared and balanced plans if clear decision rules are made before-
hand on when and how to use the information. During the  Ebola
outbreak in West Africa, coordination as well as good data from the
ground were crucial for an effective response: without good know-
ledge of where the pandemic had spread and who had been in contact
with the sick and the dead, no effective response was possible. Simi-
larly, without good data on where communities are cut off and what is
required to re-establish infrastructure after flooding or an earthquake,
those implementing a response plan will move resources to the wrong
places.
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Scalable delivery systems to reach poor and vulnerable populations
after a disaster are also essential. Setting up the logistics for delivering
food or health care after disasters requires considerable planning
beforehand. Instead of establishing new delivery structures, govern-
ments might find that a much more promising route is to build a
disaster response into the existing systems. Increasingly, even poor
countries have developed rather well-functioning social-protection
mechanisms, targeting poor and vulnerable households. The idea is
to have these systems ready at all times to expand quickly to reach
more people or to implement higher levels of transfers. Such shock-
responsive social protection could provide the institutional structures
needed to reach the poor and vulnerable quickly and at scale.11
During ‘normal’ circumstances, these schemes tend to be relatively
well defined—for example, Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Pro-
gramme (PSNP) covers many millions of food-insecure people in
normal circumstances. As part of the disaster-preparedness plan,
one could take all the steps needed beforehand to allow this scheme
to expand at scale—both in terms of giving higher payouts to already
enrolled people and in terms of expanding the scheme to other pre-
defined groups that now are vulnerable. This possibility is present in
the PSNP. This is also the principle underlying Kenya’s Hunger Safety
Net Programme: it can expand when a drought occurs, using a pre-
defined trigger. Similar arrangements could be made for other essen-
tial services during a crisis, such as expanding public health or WASH
(water, sanitation, and hygiene) interventions during crisis situations,
not in an improvised way but in one planned ahead of time. And there
are alternatives or additions to cash transfer schemes if the circum-
stances allow: for example, populations may be covered by subsidized
agricultural or homeowners’ disaster insurance.
After a disaster strikes, much humanitarian support is often
delivered in kind, such as food, but evidence suggests that this is
frequently not the best response.12 Trying to deliver food directly to
people is costly and logistically demanding. Often during disasters,
even when there are droughts or harvest failures in particular areas,
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the overall food supplies per se are not the problem. The more cost-
effective, more transparent, and faster alternative is to ensure that
vulnerable populations are offered income support—cash—so they
can afford to buy the food and other essentials they need. However,
markets must also be monitored to ensure that they are functioning
and well stocked. With today’s technology, cash can be sent to vast
numbers of people via mobile phones and other methods, which
makes cash transfers even faster and more transparent than people
procuring and delivering goods. The typical current default in deliver-
ing support is to deliver it in kind. Changing the default setting by
always delivering cash unless there is an explicit rationale not to do so
would be consistent with the evidence.13
Lessons from Insurance
At this point, a plan is in place, and systems are ready to deliver at scale
when required. But how will those implementing the plan ensure it
will happen—that is, how will they make sure there is take-off when
the launch sequence is completed? Is it possible to design objective
triggers that are both reliable and trustworthy? And, above all, can the
data system that drives decisions be both difficult to ‘game’ and
sensible? These requirements raise many additional questions. As for
gaming, is it possible to know that the data really are objective and
trustworthy? Can people manipulate the data system in their favour?
As for being sensible, does the system strike an appropriate balance
between accuracy, timeliness, and cost? That question, in turn, raises
other considerations: Is the system accurate enough to be used to
trigger post-disaster action? What is the likelihood of it misfiring,
either triggering when it should not or not triggering when it should?
Is the system timely enough? Does it strike the right balance between
early, approximately targeted action and later, more precisely targeted
action? Finally, how much will the data system itself cost?
These are the very questions that insurers grapple with when they
sign disaster insurance contracts. Therefore, those designing good
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triggers to induce action by governments or international organiza-
tions could learn a few lessons from them. As insurers know all too
well, as soon as the data begin to drive decisions and financial flows,
there will be attempts to manipulate or falsify the data—for example,
to make a fraudulent claim that a home was damaged by a flood even
though it was not. Or a poorly designed system could incite some
people to become negligent about reducing their risk to disasters—an
issue known as ‘moral hazard’. For example, they might not adopt
basic flood protection measures because they know their insurance
will cover any loss. Moral hazard, as characterized by economists, is
not a moral judgement on the behaviour of an individual in a system;
it is a judgement on the system itself. If farmers can receive more
money from insurers, government, or donors when they underinvest
in risk reduction or adaptation to climate change, there is something
wrong with the system. If governments can get more money from
donors or the international humanitarian system or indeed insurance
companies if they underinvest in resilience, there is also something
wrong with the system.
A credible system, then, has to be based on credible data. After a
flood, how does the national government know whether a school has
actually been damaged, whether a farmer has actually lost her harvest,
or whether a homeowner has actually lost his home? How does the
government ensure that people are not fiddling with the data to get
more support than they should? If the data that drive post-disaster
decisions are discretionary, then the system is discretionary. Credible
data are needed on damage and loss, or at least on credible proxies for
these, and that means investing in data systems, people, and processes
before a disaster to ensure that after the disaster the money flows to
where it is needed. In short, the data have to be objective and protected
from meddling, and the system must be structured in a way that does
not give people incentives to change their behaviour pre-disaster to
game the system.
A decision system also must be based on the right data, striking a
sensible balance between timeliness, accuracy, and cost. In the
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Box .: Three Rules-Based Approaches Used by Insurance
Companies to Assess Damage and Loss from a Disaster
Individual Loss Adjustment
Most traditional insurance contracts are indemnity-based—that is, what
triggers a payout is a loss, and the insurance indemnifies the policy-
holder against the loss. In practice, that means the insurance company
has to send a certified loss adjuster who assesses objectively the actual
damage for each insured farm, building, or injured person, which is
costly, or it has to trust the information provided by the policyholder,
which may not be trustworthy.
This process typically does not work very well for disasters because,
first, it takes time to assess individually each insured object or person
affected by the disaster to confirm that a falsified claim was not submit-
ted; and, second, the process opens the door to moral hazard—for
example, a farmer does not work as hard on her farm because she
knows that if the crop fails during a drought the insurer will pay. An
insurer may respond to such a possibility by adding lots of conditions to
contracts. For example, a contract may specify that drought-resistant
seed must be used and pesticide must be applied to insured crops.
Area Average Index
For a given area, an insurer can estimate the average damage to farms,
buildings, or people by either calculating and summing all the individual
damage or using the power of statistical sampling. The insurance payout
rate for everyone insured in that area would then be the same. This ‘area
average index’ approach can be much cheaper than an individual loss
adjustment and can substantially reduce the moral hazard because no
one person can influence the index. For example, the average crop yield
in a subdistrict as measured by a series of statistical samples of crop yields
might yield a reasonable estimate of how much farmers in the subdistrict
have suffered from drought, and no individual farmer would be able to
substantially influence the index.
The advantage of such indexes is that, by design, they are not sensitive
to the behaviour of individuals (thereby reducing the moral hazard),
and the information on which they are based can be collected in ways
that make them difficult to manipulate (thereby reducing the potential
for fraud). Their big disadvantage is that they do not capture the
(continued )
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immediate aftermath of a disaster it may be that only quite crude
information is available to drive decisions, but over time more accur-
ate information can be usefully collected to refine and better target
later, complementary responses.
Insurance companies have struggled with this problem for decades
and have come up with three rules-based approaches for trying to
capture whether a person or building has suffered damage from a
disaster while also trying to economize on the cost of information.
Described in Box ., these approaches are the individual loss assess-
ment, the area average index, and the parametric index.
How do these three types of data rank in terms of cost, accuracy,
and speed? Typically, the individual loss adjustment is the most
heterogeneity of impact within the area—a tropical cyclone, say, may
have damaged only some buildings in the area, but insurance based on
indexes treats all buildings as though they had the same severity of
damage. And such an index can be quite expensive to implement
because it requires a sampling frame and audited loss adjustment.
Parametric Index
In this different type of index-based insurance approach, payouts are
based on parametric triggers that are correlates of losses, not individual or
area average losses themselves. For example, satellite data on rainfall or the
blueness of the ground might serve as a reasonable proxy for the degree of
flooding, or data on ground acceleration from an earthquake monitoring
station might be a reasonable proxy for the destructive power of an
earthquake. These policies offer a big advantage: when a serious event
happens, there is no costly verification and typically no need for anyone to
even travel to the disaster-affected area to conduct a loss adjustment.1 As a
result, payouts can be very fast and there is little room for fraudulent
manipulation. The main disadvantage of such an approach, as a type of
index insurance, is the risk that a payout is not made even though a loss
has occurred and the risk that a payout might be made even though there
is no loss.
1 There are exceptions—for example, for rain gauges or river flow stations
that have to be read manually. However, even these are increasingly automated.
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expensive and the slowest; the area average index is in the middle on
both counts; and the parametric is the least expensive and fastest.
However, the order is reversed when it comes to accuracy, with
individual loss adjustment on top, followed by the area average
index and then the parametric index.
Applying Rules-Based Approaches
to Disaster Planning
The three approaches described in Box . are also the right ones to
consider when thinking about developing data systems that will provide
a foundation for automated specific response plans. In some cases, a
crude individual loss assessment, such as targeting all those displaced or
all those with a collapsed roof or flooded home, may be quite effective.
The data system underlying this approach would have to operate much
like loss adjustment works for individual indemnity insurance.
This approach requires a system for individual loss adjustment and
auditing, as well as trained adjusters. Otherwise, the response might be
too slow, or it might be manipulated by those on the ground. Some
conditions may also have to be set for protection, such as requiring
that a building satisfy a certain building code. In most post-disaster
situations, however, the default setting should not be requiring imple-
menting agencies to wait for a full comprehensive assessment of
damage or loss. Rather, the response should be designed to evolve
as new data become available. Where early action is important, as it
usually is, triggers should be based on index insurance products (area
average or parametric indexes, depending on the relative cost, speed,
and accuracy). The use of clear and transparent triggers based on the
information that is immediately available (and not with long delays on
losses linked to data collection) could serve as a kind of triage for
prioritizing response. Actions, then, would be based on forecast
rainfall or harvest failures, the distance to the epicentres of earth-
quakes and their magnitude, or the number of cases of a serious
infectious disease.
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These triggers could build on the data generated by the existing
early warning systems, which are much better than they used to be.
For example, better information is available on hydro-meteorological
systems and their likely consequences, including their impacts on
harvests, flooding, or cyclones; slow-onset disasters can be better
predicted, including links to famine or public-health problems; and
even early warning systems for rapid-onset disasters such as earth-
quakes and tsunamis are in place in some countries and are getting
better.14
It is important to continue to improve early warning systems, but
by themselves they are by no means sufficient for good decision
making. An early warning is of limited use if the main response,
especially support for reconstruction and for protecting livelihoods,
is always late. The longer the wait after a disaster, the easier it is to
justify a need, but acting early is typically much more cost-effective.
For example, reports of Ebola circulated for many months before any
kind of serious international action was taken.15 Similarly, drought in
some areas in the Horn of Africa and East Africa was reported in ,
many months before the world took notice and began to respond.16
To work as an index insurance product, a trigger should not lead to a
set of options for a decision-making body; it should result in an
automatic decision. In other words, a defined set of indicators reach-
ing particular pre-agreed values should lead to a defined action,
as in insurance. Early warning systems would turn into early action
systems.
Other monitoring data can also be useful when contemplating
action. Some observers have claimed that the Ebola outbreak was
subdued not only by social mobilization but also by careful informa-
tion gathering and processing (such as incidents of unsafe burial or
rumours of hidden cases) that received an immediate response. Simi-
larly, there is good evidence that in the  Kashmir earthquake
systematic information platforms such as RISEPAK offered live
updates on where the needs were throughout a long period, thereby
improving the effectiveness of the response.17 Thanks to the advances
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in satellite imaging and social media and in other digital areas, sys-
tematic information gathering is now considerably easier, but plan-
ning beforehand on how to use it and what information will trigger
specific action is important. And some data systems, such as those for
national health and nutrition surveillance data, are still quite expensive
and will take many years to build.
User-generated data are, of course, susceptible to fraudulent
manipulation, and so by themselves are not useful as a trigger for
financing. However, they could still be used as part of a rules-based
system for action, in particular for guiding when to collect the data
needed for more accurate but expensive back-up triggers. For
example, suppose a government wants to protect farmers against a
severe loss in crop production and chooses to do so using a combin-
ation of a trigger based on rainfall and a back-up trigger based on an
area average yield index. If the area average yield index is quite
expensive to calculate, the government could decide whether to
collect the data for a back-up trigger using a cellphone survey that
indicated it had been a very bad crop year—a situation not being
picked up by the rainfall trigger.
Rules and triggers also can be applied to early action, recognizing
that no early-action rule can be perfect. It is inevitable that a response
will be too late for some droughts and too early for others. But a rule
for early action does not have to be perfect to be better than waiting—
it just has to be good enough. And the science of droughts is certainly
good enough to ensure that early action is better than waiting.
In fact, providing cash or food to households early in the face of an
ensuing drought seems to be much more cost-effective for reducing
food insecurity than waiting until the drought is in full swing. In the
Horn of Africa and pastoral areas of East Africa, the rainy season in
early  failed, and the rains the previous year had also been poor, so
substantial hardship could be expected. Nevertheless, several months
passed before a response began, leading to delays in reaching people.18
A more appropriate response would have been to trigger at least some
actions as soon as it became clear that the rains were poor, several
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months earlier, even though farmers still had reserves by then.
In that case, help could have been on the ground much more quickly,
pre-empting difficulties (and benefiting frommuch cheaper operations).
Reconstruction of damaged lifeline infrastructure such as hospitals
and key roads after a large earthquake is another area that could
benefit from agreement before a disaster on an objective, transparent,
independent, manipulation-resistant procedure for determining the
damage and rules for determining who will pay for reconstruction.
And yet this crucial work is often delayed because after a disaster
different parts of government are negotiating over the total cost of the
damage and who will pay.
Just as it is for disaster insurance, the heart of a minimal response
plan will always be the data. If the data are too easy to manipulate, too
costly, too slow, or too unreliable, the system will not be politically
sustainable. And just as for insurance, getting it right will require
investing in systems and people before disasters, so that the data-
collection process can run smoothly during and in the aftermath of a
disaster. Good data will be at the core of any attempt to change the
default setting from inaction to action because they will give credibil-
ity to the decision rules required.
For Benefactors, a New Strategy
Benefactors who care about the impact of their financial support
should be willing to settle for a new decision-making system. Instead
of waiting for the appearance of begging bowls after a disaster,
benefactors could agree to commit the majority of their funds to
financing the planning, preparation, and implementation of the
coordinated default response to a disaster as described in the response
and recovery plan. It would not be a vague, unwieldy plan, but a
pre-agreed, coordinated plan with a specific, defined set of actions to
which they would commit.
To make this work, discretion needs to be replaced by rules to guide
decision making—that is, triggers for action and a credible commitment.
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It will help to overcome procrastination and inertia, the enemies of fast
decision making. In the process, many of the bureaucratic or political
incentives for inaction will disappear. And moving from post-disaster
discretion towards pre-disaster rules can help to clarify ownership of the
risk—who is responsible for what—and this can promote good incen-
tives for investments in preparedness and risk reduction and avoid regret
afterwards.
Even when decision making is governed by decision rules and
algorithms and early warning leads automatically to early action,
there is still ample room for political leadership. It is not about the
computers taking over, generating triggers to which one needs to
respond without judgement. It is about changing the default setting.
Instead of inaction and the status quo being the default, triggers will
start actions, and policymakers will need to act to stop action.
Leaders of national governments and international organizations
would then have to justify why they stopped or changed their early
action systems from being implemented in, say, a drought. In the recent
Ebola outbreak, for example, slow decision making and delayed declar-
ation of an emergency were generally acknowledged to have caused
loss of life and hardship for many. The approach to a disaster response
we propose would have changed the dynamic of the decision making,
putting a focus on stopping action if leaders had so wished. During a
drought, a response would also be triggered automatically—for
example, based on harvest forecasts from weather data. Leaders could
stop the response, but they would no doubt be cautious in doing so.
As plans are implemented, new data become available, and further
actions and course corrections are triggered, leaders will need to keep
everyone on board and hold the course. They will need to show concern
and commitment to all those affected, communicate what is being done
to all involved, and coalesce all in the mission to deliver. No pre-agreed
plan, no rules will be perfect. There will be times when triggers fail or are
imprecise. Leaders will need to judge information on unforeseen mat-
ters, justify any deviations from plans, and act accordingly, without
allowing special interests to take over and game the system.
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The result of this new approach will be the emergence of a new
accountability during disasters. Meanwhile, leaders can take political
credit for implementing the plans to which they previously agreed.
Yes, they can overrule systems, but they can expect to be judged for
deviations from agreed plans.
Recapping . . .
. By ensuring that as little as possible must be decided by
stakeholders when a disaster strikes, rules can promote decisive,
timely action.
. A rules-based system is only as good as the data that drive it. The
data need to be resistant to manipulation and strike the right
balance between cost, speed, and reliability.
. Any data that could trigger action will depend on investments
before a disaster in design of the data-collection system, including
an audit function, and in the human and technological capacity to
collect data in a timely manner.
. Three types of data are particularly useful for triggering post-
disaster action: ground data on the damage to or losses of people
and buildings, area average index data on damage and losses, and
parametric indexes.
. No rule is perfect, and so there should be some discretionary
back-up system to deal with situations in which the rules fail.
. Benefactors should channel their financial support into precise
sets of plans in which it is clear who exactly is being protected,
how, and who is paying.
A Snapshot of the Literature
Early behavioural economics literature provides strong motivation for
considering simple plans. Simon’s Rational Choice and the Structure of the
Environment () hypothesized that human beings have limited cog-
nitive capacities, and therefore simple approaches may be more
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effective than technically first best approaches that are not sufficiently
well understood. One implication is that using simple algorithms and
clear decision rules will improve decision making (Gigerenzer and
Goldstein ). For example, in medicine the use of checklists in
diagnosis has contributed to much better diagnosis and treatment
(Pronovost et al. ; Gawande ). Clear heuristics also help to
overcome confirmation bias when relying on experts. This bias is the
tendency to search for or interpret information in a way that confirms
one’s preconceptions, leading to statistical errors.
Rational decision making is also affected by other cognitive biases
(for an introduction, see Kahneman ). Present bias is the tendency
to over-value immediate rewards at the expense of long-term inten-
tions. It can lead to procrastination—situations in which the current
self defers decisions towards some long-term goal while planning for
some future self to pursue it. Hyperbolic preferences can be used to
model this behaviour, which is called time-inconsistent and leads to
regret (as the future self will have wanted the current self to have acted
differently). O’Donoghue and Rabin () discuss such preferences in
more detail. Present bias may be overcome using commitment devices
and other ways to increase self-control. Thaler and Bernatzi ()
show how ‘Save More Tomorrow’ can overcome lower pension sav-
ings because of the present bias caused by limited self-control. The
essence of the programme is straightforward: people commit in
advance to allocating a portion of their future salary increases towards
retirement savings. Ashraf et al. () found that commitment sav-
ings products can increase savings for people who may display pre-
sent bias in the Philippines.
Another bias affecting decision making is status quo bias, a preference
for the current state of affairs, even if there would be gains from change
(Samuelson and Zeckhauser ). Loss aversion is a possible explan-
ation (Kahneman et al. ). Overcoming status quo bias is possible
through changes in the default option, such as automatically enrolling
workers in pension schemes and making them act to leave the scheme
rather thanmaking them act to join. Madrian and Shea () show how
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changing this default increases the uptake of retirement savings products
in a context in which too little retirement savings take place.
At the level of governments, time-inconsistent preferences have
also been observed. It is well recognized that governments are often
tempted not to do what they said they would do, or do things now
that later on they will regret. This time inconsistency can often benefit
from institutional designs that make government’s announcements
credible. For example, a credible commitment to a monetary policy
rule, such as the Taylor rule (Taylor ), could perform substantially
better than a discretionary approach in which government is given full
discretion at every moment in time (Lucas ; Kydland and Prescott
). This insight led to central banks being given some degree of
political independence over monetary policy, so that they can operate
under clear rules and not the discretion of political leaders.
Time inconsistency problems in public policy appear in a range of
situations. For example, in developing countries a government is
unable to make a commitment to private firms that, if they invest in
public infrastructure such as a water or electricity distribution net-
work, they will be allowed to recoup their investment (Estache and
Wren-Lewis ). A government that cannot commit to sticking to
its original contract—that is, it will not renegotiate a contract as soon
as the private investment in infrastructure is made—will not find any
private firms willing to invest in infrastructure, leading to an infra-
structure deficit.
Buzzacchi and Turati () find that in a situation in which a
beneficiary is able to make investments in risk reduction and a bene-
factor is unable to observe these investments, a decision by the
benefactor to cap its total budget for discretionary relief—a commit-
ment device—can improve welfare by reducing the incentive for the
beneficiary to underinvest in risk reduction.
The economics of insurance fraud, or misreporting of information,
offers some insight into insurance contracting. Townsend () con-
siders a model in which verifying claims is costly, and Lacker and
Weinberg () consider an alternative formulation in which
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verifying claims carries no cost, but the beneficiary is able to falsify
claims at some cost. Both models find deductibles to be part of the
optimal solution—for losses below a threshold there will be no
insurance claim payment—and Lacker and Weinberg’s model recog-
nizes the use of underinsurance for extreme, falsifiable perils. Both
findings are observed in insurance markets.
The idea of an indexed approach to financial protection probably
began with the book by Chakravarti () outlining a detailed pro-
posal for the sale of rainfall-indexed insurance across India. Since then,
the idea has gained momentum, particularly for agricultural insurance
in developing countries—the traditional farm-based loss adjustment
was too expensive and exposed the insurer to moral hazard (Hazell
; Skees et al. ; Hess et al. )—and for quick post-disaster
liquidity at the sovereign level (Ghesquiere and Mahul ), where a
detailed assessment of losses is too slow for immediate post-disaster
needs.
The downside of indexed protection is that the index may not
accurately capture the actual situation on the ground, thereby under-
estimating a severe loss or overestimating a minor one. Unsurpris-
ingly, the more inaccurate the index, the less useful it is as a risk
management tool (Clarke ) and the lower the demand for indexed
protection (Mobarak and Rosenzweig ). One might reasonably
believe that an inaccurate index would be little used and therefore
would do no damage. However, Morsink () found that Ethiopian
farmers who were offered indexed protection but did not take it up
received significantly lower discretionary post-disaster transfers from
other farmers in their community than farmers who were not offered
the indexed protection. Low quality indexed protection, it seems, can
crowd out informal risk sharing.
How challenging is it to develop accurate indexes, particularly
parametric indexes? Jensen et al. () found the accuracy of a para-
metric index designed by a top academic team to capture the drought-
induced mortality of livestock in northern Kenya quite poor. Clarke
et al. () conducted a similar but somewhat crude analysis of
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weather index insurance for Indian farmers. They found that the
indexes miss an average of one of every three catastrophe years.
Various authors have argued for long-term public investments in
accurate indexes (Verdin et al. ; Carter et al. ; Chantarat
et al. ; ).
Indexed social protection has been implemented by the govern-
ment of Mexico through its CADENA programme, which provides
farmers with free state-level insurance against drought. It has been
shown to induce positive risk-management responses demonstrated
by the higher yields observed where coverage is available (Fuchs and
Wolff ). A range of authors have considered the opportunities for
and practical challenges of using indexes to trigger shock-responsive
social protection (Alderman and Haque ; Barnett et al. ;
Bastagli and Hardman ). Pelham et al. () make the case for
the importance of shock-responsive social safety nets as a tool for
managing disaster risks. In particular, the authors show that safety
nets can be useful both pre-disaster, to prevent and mitigate disaster
risks, and post-disaster, to cope with the effects of natural disaster
shocks. Hobson and Campbell () have investigated the conditions
needed to achieve a successful response to shocks through a social
safety net.
Building on Hobson and Campbell (), Slater and Bhuvanendra
() argue that a successful shock response through a safety net
programme requires a wide range of institutional and financial
arrangements to be in place. Bastagli and Holmes () analyse the
criteria necessary to determine whether social protection is effective in
responding to shocks, while Grosh et al. () look into what can be
learned from previous crises about what may constitute an appropri-
ate crisis response.
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FINANCE AS THE GLUE
In the early morning of  September , an earthquake thatregistered . on the Richter scale struck Mexico City, bringing
down tens of thousands of buildings and seriously damaging tens
of thousands more. It killed at least , people, and left some
, homeless. The city suffered major damage because of the
large magnitude of the quake and the ancient lake bed on which
Mexico City sits.
That Mexico should be hit by such an extreme event like this
earthquake should not have come as a surprise. With its diverse
geography, the country is in fact exposed to a wide variety of geo-
logical and hydro-meteorological hazards: earthquakes, volcanoes,
tsunamis, hurricanes, wildfires, floods, landslides, and droughts. How-
ever, despite being a reasonably well-off middle-income country, it
was underprepared to deal with such a calamity, and serious political
fallout followed.1
The  quake triggered a national dialogue on disaster risk man-
agement, and the government of Mexico responded by making it a
national priority and by investing to make the country more resilient.
One component of this effort was the establishment in  of
the Natural Disaster Fund (Fondo Nacional de Desastres Naturales),
commonly known as FONDEN. Initially, it was intended to finance
post-disaster reconstruction of public infrastructure and low-income
housing without the need to gouge other parts of the national budget
in the event of a disaster.2
Instead of purchasing insurance for each government-owned road,
school, hospital, water distribution pipe, electricity line, and piece of
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other infrastructure, FONDEN acts like an insurer. It covers the full
cost of the reconstruction of any federally owned infrastructure and
 per cent of the cost of any state or municipally owned infrastruc-
ture. It finances ‘build back better’, allowing the reconstruction of
more resilient infrastructure at higher standards and the relocation
of public buildings and low-income communities to safer zones. To
pay for all this, FONDEN has an annual budget allocation from the
federal government, akin to an insurer’s capital base, and purchases a
large reinsurance policy and a catastrophe bond to protect its balance
sheet against really big disasters, again like an insurer would.3
FONDEN has very clear rules about what reconstruction it will
finance and when, similar to the rules that might be found in an
insurance policy, but it faces the risk that state governments will
inflate their reported losses from disasters and use political pressure
to get their way. To protect against this, the government of Mexico
has invested in an army of independent loss adjusters who are
responsible for objective post-disaster damage assessments and
who are overseen jointly by government and its consortium of
reinsurers. Reinsurance therefore has a dual purpose: to help pay
for reconstruction costs in the worst years and to act as an Odyssean
pact, enabling the government of Mexico to credibly commit to
objective independent loss adjustment in line with its rules of oper-
ation and in turn to insulate FONDEN from potential post-disaster
political pressures.4
If done well, as in Mexico, financial planning for disasters can be the
glue that holds together all the pieces of a carefully defined recovery
plan and makes it credible and strong enough to withstand the
whirlwind of highly charged post-disaster politics. As the government
of Mexico found when developing FONDEN, financial wizardry is
important, but it should be the servant, not the master, of a disaster
response and recovery plan.
Just as different types of glue are available for fixing different
materials, so too different kinds of budgetary and financial instru-
ments are available to governments, donors or other organizations for
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different kinds of response and recovery plan. Showing the potential
use and misuse of these instruments is the purpose of this chapter.
Can Financial Instruments Replace a Disaster Plan?
The amount or type of glue used, or the number or complexity of
instruments adopted, is not a good measure of financial planning.
Crowing over a big budget for disaster response or preparedness may
be misleading. The total budget for disaster response is hardly a
measure of effective planning because it can be easily spent poorly.
Likewise, it is easy to be seduced by an especially dramatic-sounding
financial instrument that promises to solve all problems. Focusing on
a particular financial instrument misses the point, and thinking that
financial instruments can replace having a plan is misguided. Just
because catastrophe reinsurance has been bought or a large contin-
gency fund has been set up does not mean it is the right solution for
the circumstances and the organization involved.
Financial instruments will be useful to governments and donors,
just as they are to insurers, but for them to give the biggest bang for
buck they should form part of the plan, not define the plan. Without
something to stick together, playing with glue just makes a mess, and
without a clear plan to stick together, whizzy financial instruments are
a waste of money. Just as with glue, the usefulness of a financial
instrument for financing the risks associated with disasters comes
from applying it appropriately.
So, suppose that a government or donor has a plan it wishes to
finance. How should it actually develop strategies to bind the plan
together and make it credible? Essentially, such an effort has two parts.
The first is ensuring that the right amount of money is available
quickly when—and only when—it is required by the plan. The second
is ensuring that the money is spent on what it is supposed to be spent
on and accounted for in a clear, transparent fashion. For example,
a ministry of transportation might ensure that US$ million is
available within a week of an earthquake of magnitude . and that
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this money actually finances the emergency livelihood support and
reconstruction of the lifeline infrastructure for which it is intended.
This practice, termed disaster risk finance, should bind the various
partners to the pre-agreed objectives, decision processes, and imple-
mentation modalities. It should give all parties confidence that the
plan is credible.
Thinking Like an Insurance Company
In many ways, financial planning for disasters is easier now than ever
before because of the huge growth in the range of instruments avail-
able and the wealth of knowledge in the insurance industry. There is
magic in a good insurance policy: it creates certainty when an unexpected
event occurs. That means that even though people face lots of risks, the
consequences of some of these risks becoming reality are known with
certainty. If a kitchen floods but a good home insurance policy is in
effect, the result will be lots of inconvenience, but a predetermined
share of the material losses will be covered with certainty. If a driver
crashes into someone else’s car, the insurance company of the car
owner, the damaged party, will settle with the driver’s insurance
company to ensure that the car owner is paid for the damage. The
key is certainty, which is created by the credibility of the arrangement:
a contract with the insurance company, as well as good regulation and
legal frameworks, ensures that insurance companies will indeed do
what is expected of them in line with the contract.
Suppose there is an agency in charge of disaster response and
preparedness. If it were to learn to think like a reputable insurance
company, it would get better at credible financial planning for disas-
ters. Suppose the agency and political leaders have agreed who and
what will be protected, against what, and how the protection will
work. This ‘how’ provides the blueprint for a well-defined response
and recovery plan to which the agency is committed, as if there is a
political contract with the citizens it is entrusted to protect. As dis-
cussed in Chapter , this agency would then work with engineers and
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logistical experts to ensure it has a clear idea of how much cash the
plan would require in the aftermath of different disasters. It would also
work with scientists and risk modellers to understand the likelihood of
different types of disaster occurring. These two tracks of technical
work would allow the agency to develop a probabilistic assessment of
its potential financial liability, its contingent liability. Armed with this,
the agency would then use actuaries and other financial experts to
piece together different budgetary and financial instruments to form a
strategy that would ensure it could meet this contingent liability as
cost-effectively as possible.
Our advice to such an agency, or to a ministry, or a local or
international non-governmental organization (NGO) involved in dis-
aster response is this: think like insurance companies and responses
will be more cost-effective with better outcomes. National govern-
ments, donors and international organizations would function a lot
better if they worked together pre-disaster to clarify what contingent
liabilities they would each take on, and then ensured that these
liabilities were financed in the most cost-effective way. It does not
help anyone to declare that all needs will be met, without a precise,
measurable definition of need, a clear plan for how to address the need
in a timely manner, and a credible financing strategy. In other words,
like an insurer, develop a rules-based plan and then finance the plan,
do not try to finance the need directly. As we discussed in Chapter ,
there will always be the need for a back-up for when plans fail or the
unforeseen happens, but for the bulk of disaster response and recon-
struction there is an urgent need for a clearer articulation of who owns
what risk and a credible financing strategy to increase its effectiveness
and the value for money it can offer. And this is where thinking like an
insurer can really pay off.5
Preparing Like an Insurance Company
The contingent liability of a disaster response and recovery plan will
encompass the full costs of the risks taken on by the government or
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agency that owns the plan. This financial liability will include the value
of the transfers in cash or in kind that need to reach particular people,
the staffing and other logistics costs, the costs of repairing infrastruc-
ture, and any other people, firms, organizations, or assets whose losses
the plan aims to cover. So how do planners go about designing the
financing strategy to cover this entire contingent liability?
The insurance industry has plenty of experience in how to finance a
contingent liability. Although medieval begging bowls may still rule
disaster finance in many countries, the relevant insurance methods
and practices have evolved during centuries of experimenting with
risk financing. In fact, insurance companies, pension funds, and their
regulators have long solved the key problems of effective disaster risk
financing. It is worth explaining how this works.
In a well-regulated market, insurance companies are not allowed to
sell insurance policies against disasters unless they can demonstrate
up front that they would be able to pay claims as they fall due with a
very high degree of certainty. In insurance terms, insurers need to be
able to demonstrate that they are actuarially sound, which means that
a certified actuary has deemed their financing plan sufficient to meet
the needs of the plan, even after an unusually devastating disaster.
To meet this requirement, an insurer traditionally has had a capital
base (such as a bank account with money in) to cover all but the most
extreme potential losses and it has taken out a reinsurance policy in
case it faces such extreme losses that they might exhaust its capital
base. The capital base enables the insurer to retain some of the risk,
making a profit most of the time but suffering a big loss if claims are
much higher than expected. The reinsurance policy enables the
insurer to transfer some of the risk to a reinsurer, so that the reinsurer
would share in some of the profit if claims are lower than expected but
contribute to the cost of very large claims. By buying reinsurance, an
insurer transfers part of its balance-sheet risk to the reinsurer, which
can retain most of it by holding a massive capital base designed to
soak up a diversified portfolio of global risks. In short, the insurance
company engages in risk retention via a capital base and in risk
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transfer via reinsurance. The reinsurance company does the same,
although it typically retains more of the risk. Over time, there has
been a lot of growth in the variety and type of risk-retention and risk-
transfer instruments available to insurers, but the basic principles
remain.
These principles should form the basis of a financial strategy for a
government or an organization committed to covering particular
contingent liabilities. It must decide how much risk it will retain and
how much risk it will transfer, and which financial and budgetary
instruments to use for this. The same applies to international organ-
izations or donors: they may not see themselves as insurance com-
panies, but could see themselves as reinsurance providers, reinsuring
quite extreme risks from countries or organizations, or as insurance
brokers, setting up schemes and instruments that allow risk transfer
into bigger and better reserve funds and global insurance markets.
A combination of risk-retention and risk-transfer instruments can
form the basis of a credible financing strategy of response and recov-
ery plans for natural disasters or pandemics, and indeed the various
layers of the global humanitarian system.
But before turning to these instruments we would like to recog-
nize another option: a government or organization may not want to
prepare or act like an insurance company. Instead, it might prefer to
pass on its contingent liability entirely to a regulated insurance
company by fully or partially buying insurance policies itself for all
the people or specific assets insured. It then prefers to ‘buy insurance’
rather than to ‘be the insurer’. In countries with weak insurance
regulation, this may require investment to ensure that commercial
insurers manage this disaster risk in an actuarially sound way, or in
some cases a government may wish to set up a new insurance
provider that is subject to stricter rules. This may be a fruitful
route for specific large, publicly owned assets—for example, govern-
ment buildings in Peru are all legally covered via specific building
insurance. And, as will be discussed in more detail shortly, partially
subsidizing insurance policies for farmers, homeowners, and firms
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may be a sensible part of a government strategy, but it can by no
means be all.
Choosing among Financial Instruments
What sorts of financial instrument are available to a government or
organization to cover the contingent liabilities it has taken on? The
budgetary and financial instruments available to a government, its
partners, and its insurers to finance the cost of disasters can be
categorized across two dimensions: risk retention versus risk transfer
and ex ante versus ex post. Table . describes the key instruments and
offers some definitions.6
Risk-retention instruments do not take risk off the balance sheet—
the cost of a disaster must still be repaid. The instrument just offers
more flexibility in how and when one would have to pay. Contingency
funds, budget allocations, and lines of contingent credit are all risk-
retention instruments, as are budget reallocations, tax increases, and
post-disaster credit. By comparison, risk-transfer instruments remove
volatility from one’s own balance sheet and transfer it to somebody
else’s. Insurance is the classic risk-transfer instrument, but for govern-
ments and insurers the range of risk-transfer instruments is enormous
and growing by the day, including indemnity reinsurance, indexed
reinsurance, catastrophe bonds, and catastrophe swaps. Soliciting
contributions from the international community is a form of risk
transfer for governments, although it is typically undisciplined, unpre-
dictable, and slow.
Ex post instruments do not require advance planning. For example,
governments could choose to finance a disaster through donor con-
tributions, a budget reallocation, new loans, or tax increases. None of
these requires pre-disaster planning. By comparison, ex ante instru-
ments require proactive advance planning and include reserves or
contingency funds, budget contingencies, contingent debt facilities,
and a range of insurance or other risk-transfer products.
For a government choosing to be the insurer, different instruments
have various advantages and disadvantages for credible financing of
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 31/3/2016, SPi
DU L L D I S A S T E R S ?

well-defined plans. Ex post instruments are not particularly useful for
credible pre-disaster plans because typically they cannot be relied on
in a contractual sense. Contributions from the international community
are famously unreliable: between  and  the annual funding
Table .: Instruments for Financing Disaster Risk










Line of contingent creditb Tax increase
Post-disaster credit












a A pre-funded pot of money that can be used for specific purposes, such as responding to
a large natural event. Resembles a current account in a bank.
b A pre-agreed loan that can only be drawn down in specific pre-agreed circumstances,
such as the onset of a large natural event or a declaration of national emergency by
government. Slightly resembles an overdraft facility, but one with rules for when the
loan can be drawn down.
c A contract whereby the insurer or reinsurer is paid a premium and the rules for claim
payments are based on the losses incurred, as measured by independent loss adjustors.
d A contract whereby the rules for the net transfer to the insurer, reinsurer, or counter-
party are based on the index. For insurance and reinsurance, payment of the premium is
followed by indexed claim payments. For an indexed derivative, the timing of payments
may differ.
e Capital market instruments such as catastrophe bonds and catastrophe swaps are
financial contracts that can be structured to act in the same way as insurance, but
investors, not necessarily reinsurers, provide the protection. A catastrophe bond is an
insurance-linked security in which payment of interest and/or principal is suspended or
cancelled in the event of a specified catastrophe, such as an earthquake. A catastrophe
swap is a contract used by investors to exchange (swap) a fixed payment for a certain
portion of the difference between insurance premiums and claims.
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received through UN-coordinated appeals ranged from a low of  per
cent in , as donors committed large volumes of funds to the
response to the Haiti earthquake early in the year, to a high of  per
cent in .7 Budget reallocations, borrowing, and new taxes are all
certainly possible post-disaster. In practice, however, they all typically
give politicians or leaders some degree of discretionary power to write
new plans to be financed, or at the very least to rewrite any pre-agreed
plan. As argued in Chapter , opening the door to such discretion slows
everything down and defeats the point of having a well-defined, credible
plan. Within such a plan, discretion should be applied only at the
technical level, not the policy level. Post-disaster instruments can be
useful for financing costs beyond the plan, but not for financing the
plan itself.
This is relevant not just for governments funding their own
response and recovery plans, but also for humanitarian NGOs, don-
ors, and international organizations committed to providing people
and countries with support. They can take responsibility for parts of
these plans, or essentially provide reinsurance to local organizations,
agencies, and countries for their plans, or broker or fund the emer-
gence of specific risk-transfer instruments that offer governments and
organizations new options for financing risk in cost-effective ways. To
be able to act in a credible way, as an insurer or a reinsurer, all these
organizations will need to decide whether to retain or to transfer
these risks. For most, ex post instruments are largely unhelpful: they
are hardly going to be able to tax or raise new budgets, and begging
bowls and appeals are unreliable. Building up a portfolio of ex ante
instruments will be essential to fulfil these organizations’ contingent
liabilities.
The Challenges and Opportunities of Ex Ante Instruments
Choosing an ex ante financial strategy is not easy, but choices can be
informed by technical analysis.
Anyone choosing among ex ante instruments should consider
four key dimensions: the discipline required to use an instrument,
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its cost, its accuracy, and the speed by which it can be converted into
cash for spending on a disaster response. For discipline, any govern-
ment or donor with a large reserve fund, budget allocation, or line of
credit set aside for financing a specific plan when required will
always come under pressure to spend those resources on other
things. If a disaster does not happen, governments, international
donors, and development banks may all come under criticism for
not disbursing funds that have been provided to support develop-
ment, and the liquidity that has been arranged to finance a specific
plan may be re-routed to discretionary spending. When a disaster
does strike, even if a financial strategy is successful at providing the
right amount of money at the right time, poor public financial
management—that is, making sure the money goes where it is
supposed to according to the pre-agreed rules—can stymie the entire
endeavour. Ex ante risk transfer instruments that transfer contingent
liabilities to the market or other agencies make it harder to game the
system for political reasons. They will be triggered only in particular
circumstances and are more easily directed to the plans they were
meant to finance. Plus, they require less discipline by the user
because discipline is built into the rules of the contract and is part
of the service provided.
In addition to instilling discipline in claim payments, indemnity-
based insurance and reinsurance can also instil discipline in risk-
reduction investments. Often the actual risk-transfer contract will
have a sensible set of conditions for investments in risk reduction
and resilience, which will be checked by the insurer or reinsurer.
Moreover, any additional investments in risk reduction over and
above this should reduce the premium, providing an immediate
financial reason for cost-effective risk-reduction investments.8 The
proof of all this? It is no coincidence that Cyclone Patricia, the
strongest cyclone ever to make landfall on the Pacific coast, did not
cause loss of life when it hit Mexico in October . The entire
financing system in Mexico promotes clear risk ownership and appro-
priate investments in risk reduction and preparedness.
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The second issue of importance when choosing among ex ante
financial instruments is the cost. There are no hard and fast rules
for what combination of instruments will be most cost-effective for
governments or donors. Relying on principles or rules of thumb
for designing a financial strategy is dangerous because the value for
money depends so much on the details. Contingency funds can yield
low investment returns and be used as a political slush fund, or they
can be run in a disciplined manner. Risk-transfer products can be
expensive, slow, and unreliable—or they can be cheap, quick, and
reliable. Lines of contingent credit can be expensive and discretionary,
or cheap and arranged in a way that promotes discipline. Financial
expertise is too important to be on the periphery of planning, and, as
with any financial product, the risk of being sold a product that is not
fit for its purpose is huge. Not for nothing did we argue in Chapter 
that the men and women of finance must be a core part of the team
that develops the plans and then guides the financial strategy through
to implementation.
Having said this, there is one rule of thumb that is useful to bear in
mind when choosing between risk transfer and risk retention: use risk
retention for more frequent losses and risk transfer for the less frequent,
larger losses. Typically, a cost-effective financial strategy will use a
number of complementary instruments, not unlike ancient cities,
which had different layers of defensive walls—the lower, thinner, outer-
most walls offered cheap but reasonable protection for minor attacks,
and the taller, thicker, innermost walls served as a reliable last line of
defence for protection against more sizeable, sophisticated, or deter-
mined aggressors. Similarly, cost-effective financial strategies for disaster
risk financing typically involve risk-retention instruments for smaller,
more frequent disasters and risk-transfer instruments for larger, more
extreme disasters. This arrangement appears over and over in risk
finance, from insurers and reinsurers to mutual insurance societies and
the insurance captives9 of large multinational companies.
This principle is relevant for risk financing by governments, even if
they usually can handle large losses on their budget.10 The reason is
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the cost of liquidity. When a government chooses to retain disaster
risk, it effectively needs to have a large pot of money sitting some-
where, waiting for a potential disaster. That pot might take the form of
a contingency fund or a budget allocation, or the government may
pay a lender to keep a pot of money available that it can borrow from
quickly in the event of a disaster, essentially an overdraft facility. Either
way, the government is paying the full cost of the liquidity itself. But
this will not be attractive for less frequent losses: the cash held would
be rarely used and thus costly. Risk transfer is, then, more attractive
because it allows the cost of liquidity be shared with others: a regular
payment can be made to have access to substantial liquid means when
required.
The final two key issues to consider when choosing among financial
instruments are accuracy and speed. Here the intuition is straight-
forward: wherever possible, the timing and triggers of the financial
instruments—in particular the triggers for any line of contingent
credit and risk-transfer instruments—should match precisely the trig-
gers in the plan. If the triggers in the plan are parametric, then
parametric triggers should be applied to the risk transfer. If the triggers
are based on individual loss adjustment, the risk transfer should be
based on this loss adjustment. Finally, speed matters, and it must play
a central role in deciding among instruments. If the plan requires
immediate access to financial resources, then instruments need to be
chosen that offer this. In general, if it is difficult to access risk-transfer
or even risk-retention instruments that match the rules in the plan in
terms of accuracy or speed, it is likely that the rules of the plan are
unworkable in a practical sense, and they may need to be rethought.
Acting Like an Insurance Company
Governments, agencies, or organizations that have prepared them-
selves like an insurance company for the contingent liabilities they
have decided to take on can go a step further: they can start acting like
an insurance company, offering a contractual relationship to clients
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that guarantees support when natural disasters hit. They can learn
from modern insurance market practice about how to behave like an
insurer and then emulate an insurer, sometimes at lower cost.
Programmes in Mexico and Kenya have done just that with good
results.11 As we described in Chapter  and elsewhere, in Mexico
FONDEN is liable for the cost of reconstructing public infrastructure
and low-income housing after natural disasters, and it operates akin to
insurance, with clear rules on what it will pay for, a financial strategy
that combines a contingency fund with risk-transfer instruments,
independent loss adjustment, and strong incentives for risk reduction
and resilience.
Also as described earlier, in Kenya about , pastoralist house-
holds are registered in the Hunger Safety Net Programme, and the
, of those deemed to be the most in need receive regular cash
transfers. In times of drought, however, the programme temporarily
scales up by making quick cash transfers to some or all of the
remaining , pastoralist households, providing them with the
means to protect their families and their animals. These additional
pastoralists are in effect covered by an insurance policy—a social
safety net that pays a cash transfer to a predefined group of pastoral-
ists when the rains fail, without delay and without questions, so they
can afford to buy food and fodder even though the harvest is bad.
Above and beyond what is being given to them for free, they also are
given the option of buying affordable insurance for more peace of
mind. The programme has simple parametric triggers for payments, in
this case satellite data on the ‘greenness’ of ground vegetation, which is
a good proxy for drought-related stress in these areas. The govern-
ment contributes a regular budget for normal years, and an inter-
national donor, the United Kingdom’s Department for International
Development, acts like a reinsurer, providing additional funds as
needed to cover the pre-agreed rules for scaling up in extreme years.
Although Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme covers mil-
lions of people and has positive impacts on people’s lives and liveli-
hoods (see Chapter ),12 it does not operate with defined triggers.
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However, since its inception in  it has had a facility to scale up the
provision of payments to additional beneficiaries and include new
beneficiaries in response to droughts. To secure its funding, a risk-
financing mechanism was introduced in  to allow the rapid
mobilization of additional resources in the event of an emergency.
For example, in  the mechanism was triggered, providing support
to an additional .million beneficiaries for three months and extend-
ing the duration of transfers for . million existing beneficiaries for
the same length of time. It now serves as the backbone of current
responses to drought because it covers some of the most vulnerable in
the population. However, further improvements could be made: it
lacks early and defined triggers that may cause delays, and there is no a
priori registration of those who may be covered when droughts or
other extreme events take place.
Some governments may recognize the virtue of insurance-like
schemes, but they are reluctant to be the insurer themselves. A few
countries such as Panama, Peru, and Colombia legally require all
government buildings to be insured.13 Where farmers, homeowners,
and businesses may be able to bear some of these risks themselves,
many governments do not want to take on the full contingent
liabilities for losses to assets and livelihoods in the event of a disaster.
Governments may provide incentives or subsidies for people to buy
insurance, either using existing commercial insurance companies
or at times setting up national insurance companies to implement
these schemes. For example, the governments of France, Japan,
New Zealand, Spain, Turkey, the state of California, and the Republic
of China (Taiwan), have all set up institutions that offer property
catastrophe insurance to homeowners and businesses, and the
governments of Canada, Cyprus, Greece, India, the Islamic Republic
of Iran, and the Philippines have all established government-owned
insurers to provide agricultural insurance.14 These schemes, and
schemes in which government partners with private insurers,
typically offer subsidized insurance whereby government contrib-
utes towards the cost of insurance. In some countries, these
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schemes are perceived to have offered a reasonable balance, restricting
the contingent liability of the government to make a sensible plan
feasible, by expecting individuals to take some responsibility by paying
part of the cost of financial protection against disasters themselves.
Although it is often successful, this approach of governments
supporting disaster insurance markets has not always been so. Some-
times, these schemes are not run on an actuarially sound basis and end
up having to be bailed out by the government after a disaster.15 Even
when such schemes are actually sound, a government often succumbs
to temptation to structure its subsidies to undermine the fundamental
principle of risk-based pricing, whereby the premium reflects the
underlying risk—for example, by capping the premium paid by the
policyholder. Such approaches may be attractive politically, because
subsidies target those at highest risk, but by structuring subsidies
in this way governments encourage people to take on more risk, or
at the very least to underinvest in sound risk management, because
by doing so the value of the subsidy is kept as high as possible.16
Making insurance compulsory is often regarded as a useful strategy for
increasing the number of people protected, thereby reducing the
potential for the presentation of begging bowls post-disaster. How-
ever, such an approach places a very high burden of care on govern-
ment to ensure that products offer value, because consumers typically
have no power to hold insurance companies to account.
Efforts by governments and donors to develop unsubsidizedmarkets
for disaster insurance have not generally been too successful, particu-
larly in poorer countries.17 Over the last decade, international donors
have supported over a hundred pilot programmes aimed at providing
unsubsidizedweather-index insurancemarkets to protect poor, vulner-
able farmers against the vagaries of the weather. A typical goal of these
programmes is for farmers to pay the full cost of their financial protec-
tion against shocks, so that after a large disaster they reliably receive fast
cash and have no need to call on government or other benefactors for
help. The policies are parametric: payments are triggered when low
rainfall or another easily measured indicator is reached.
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Although noble in their intentions, only a few of these programmes
have survived beyond the donor support, and for those that have,
there are unanswered questions about how good the protection
would actually be in a disaster. Many poor farmers seem unwilling
to pay the full cost of their financial protection themselves, and so
most agricultural insurance programmes for poor farmers that are still
in force are subsidized. No doubt, there is room to continue to
experiment with such schemes, because they could offer some cer-
tainty, not least when governments or agencies fail to act as insurers
instead. But they are probably not quite ready to be a means of
protecting large vulnerable populations during disasters. For that,
governments and other benefactors will continue to play a role, and
are likely to have to retain these contingent liabilities, acting as
insurers themselves by covering either fully or partially the costs of
providing financial protection.
The Building Blocks of a Better System
The virtues of moving towards ex ante financing of disaster risk cannot
be emphasized enough. Away goes the primacy of the begging-bowl
financing model, leaving space for the emergence of a system that
focuses on well-defined, credible plans, with better decision making
and clarity. The programmes under way in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Mexico,
while different, demonstrate how good pre-disaster planning and prep-
aration by governments can help all those affected by a natural disaster
get back on their feet as quickly as possible.
However, governments cannot typically afford to protect everyone
fully against every possible disaster. Similarly, if government leaves it
to insurance companies to try to persuade people to pay the full cost
of insurance against disasters themselves, experience suggests that
very few will end up being protected. But there is good experience
with governments joining in partnership with private insurers to offer
subsidized insurance for agriculture or for property to cope with
natural disasters. Subsidies tend to cover things such as investments
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in data, awareness, and education, and often part of the insurance
premium as well, and offer a way for government to offer to pay its
share if vulnerable people are willing to pay their share as well. For
governments that would otherwise be called on to play the role of
benefactor after a disaster, subsidized insurance solutions can offer a
planned alternative that provides better incentives and faster support.
Other instruments are also available and have been used by various
countries. In recent years, countries or organizations acting on behalf
of them have bought insurance products on the international market.
For example, in  the World Food Programme bought a paramet-
ric policy for Ethiopia from AXA that would have paid out US$
million in case of drought, but it was not renewed. Likewise, beginning
in , Malawi experimented with the use of a parametric drought
insurance policy, but discontinued that experiment after several years.
In other examples, Mexico has been buying catastrophe bonds linked
to FONDEN for some years, and the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk
Insurance Facility recently purchased one as well.
Development banks and other organizations have also been devising
promising instruments. Targeting middle-income countries, the World
Bank has developed a Deferred Drawdown Option for Catastrophe
Risks (Cat DDO). This loan can be triggered when a natural disaster
occurs. It offers immediate post-disaster liquidity, conditional upon
having a sound disaster risk management programme in place. Ten
countries have made use of this instrument.18
Groups of countries, with donor support and assistance from
international organizations, have also set up specialized institutions
targeting disaster risk management. The Caribbean Catastrophe Risk
Insurance Facility (CCRIF), established by the Caribbean Community
in  with support from the World Bank and a range of donors,
sells parametric earthquake and tropical cyclone coverage, and more
recently excess rainfall coverage. Products pay within fourteen days of
an event and are designed to offer quick liquidity to governments for
emergency response and reconstruction. For the – season, it
sold insurance to sixteen Caribbean island states and one Central
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 31/3/2016, SPi
DU L L D I S A S T E R S ?

American country, all but two of whom pay the full premium them-
selves.19 The Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Ini-
tiative (PCRAFI), a partnership between the Pacific Community,
development banks, donors, and scientists, has provided five Pacific
island states with subsidized insurance against earthquakes and trop-
ical cyclones since .20 The African Risk Capacity, set up as a
specialized agency of the African Union, provides rainfall-based para-
metric drought insurance, initially to four African countries in .21
And, after Ebola, it is likely that some countries and international
organizations will establish an insurance facility for pandemic
risks, providing insurance based on the incidence of particular highly
infectious diseases in developing countries that could pose risks for
pandemics.
And there will always be a need for back-up in foreseen circum-
stances, or when even the most carefully designed plan fails. For such
cases, ex post instruments may be necessary, and here too the details
matter. Budget reallocations may involve taking money from projects
with a high social benefit, thereby making the opportunity cost of
funds quite high. Or, at the other extreme, the opportunity costs of
funds could be very low, such as in the aftermath of the  Nepal
earthquake. Discussions with the government suggest that the emer-
gency procurement processes actually enabled it to invest budget
funds that were not disbursed.
Post-disaster fund-raising can also be implemented better or worse,
depending on how contributors arrange their finances. Arranging
funding beforehand (instead of resorting to unpredictable appeals)
will pay here as well in terms of speed and effectiveness. For example,
over the last decade the United Nations Central Emergency Response
Fund has operated as a contingency fund that can spend relatively
quickly in response to appeals to the humanitarian system, targeting
underfunded humanitarian crises. Its annual budget is typically US$
million. This has been an important innovation in the move towards
pre-disaster funding, even though the fund is relatively small compared
with the total annual humanitarian funding of approximately US$
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billion. This sort of approach to funding global appeals could be
developed further by, for example, expanding the size or moving
further towards an objective, transparent, rules-based approach based
on monitoring both natural disasters and the effectiveness of national
responses.22
NGOs will also continue to play their role as back-up. And here we
also see helpful innovation, moving away from post-disaster begging
bowls, fragmentation, and benefactor behaviours. For example,
the Start Fund is a pooled funding mechanism managed by nineteen
UK-based NGOs providing relatively small-scale funding to NGOs for
underfunded emergencies. It is supported by Irish Aid and the UK
Department for International Development.23 Its explicit purpose is to
ensure fast disbursement based on collective decision making.
These market and non-market based instruments will not guarantee
better responses to disasters. Finance or bigger budgets are not in
themselves the key problem to be resolved. But the existence and
growth of this plethora of pre-disaster instruments for risk transfer do
present the possibility of achieving credibly pre-financed, well-defined
plans in a more cost-effective and reliable way. And that may then also
reduce the need for a large back-up system for natural disasters based
on post-disaster fund-raising and other begging bowls. It would also
create the space for the humanitarian system to focus its efforts and
fund-raising more on the less tractable humanitarian challenges, such
as those in conflict settings.
Recapping . . .
. Financial and budgetary instruments are the glue that holds
credible plans together and makes them strong enough to
withstand the whirlwind of highly charged post-disaster politics.
. When designing and implementing disaster risk financing
strategies, details matter. Financial experts add value. It is
important to pay for financial advice and build in-house
expertise.
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. Discipline, cost, accuracy, and speed all matter when structuring a
disaster risk financing strategy. Speed matters but not all resources
are needed at once.
. The triggers in the financial strategy should match the triggers in
the plan. Traditional reinsurance can be particularly useful for
locking in plans for reconstruction, and indexed reinsurance can
play the same role for financing indexed early actions.
. Partially subsidized financial instruments can be used to
encourage others to contribute towards the cost of well-defined
plans.
A Snapshot of the Literature
The economics literature focuses on two rationales for governments
transferring disaster-associated risk to regulated insurers, reinsurers,
or capital markets. The first rationale is that, by swapping uncertain
contingent liabilities for a more predictable premium or fee, risk
transfer can reduce a government’s budget volatility. This rationale
draws on early theoretical work on the use of financial markets to
intermediate risk sharing by Debreu (), Borch (), and Arrow
(). Although Arrow and Lind () argue that national govern-
ments should be able to diversify risk perfectly and therefore should
have no need for risk transfer, Ghesquiere and Mahul (: )
demonstrate that this argument does not hold in two specific cases:
where a country is exposed to potential disaster losses that are large
relative to the national wealth, and where risk-retention instruments
available for immediate post-disaster funding needs are imperfect.
In practice, the former argument does not seem to be very strong,
even for the extreme case of vulnerable small island states. Von Peter
et al. () use a large panel data set of  countries and jurisdictions
over fifty-two years to argue that having larger insurance payouts after
a disaster helps post-disaster economic recovery, but because they do
not consider the cost of insurance they are unable to argue whether,
on average, insurance was beneficial to growth. Bevan and Adam
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() address this issue by applying a recent macroeconomic model
developed by the International Monetary Fund’s Research Department
(Berg et al. ) to Jamaica’s tropical cyclone risk. They find that
ex post tax-financed reconstruction of public assets would be slightly
more cost-effective than insurance, even though it would lead to
slower restoration of the public capital stock. Essentially, their finding
is that even though Jamaica is a small island state, exposed to large
potential shocks, these shocks are not large relative to national
income, and smoothing the cost of the shock over time at the national
level is slightly more cost-effective than insurance, a finding reminis-
cent of Gollier (). There is empirical support for the argument
that risk-retention instruments for immediate post-disaster funding
needs are imperfect (World Bank a; ). This means that there
does seem to be a budget volatility motivation for risk transfer for
immediate post-disaster funding needs, but not for the bulk of recon-
struction costs, which are not incurred immediately after a disaster.
The second rationale for government to engage in risk transfer is in
situations in which the beneficiary pays part of the cost of protection
and insurers and reinsurers are better able to implement risk-based
pricing than government. Under risk-based pricing, investments in
risk reduction would lead to lower-cost protection, thereby increasing
the attractiveness to the beneficiary of investments in risk reduction
with a positive net present value (Picard ; Jaffee and Russell ;
Charpentier and Le Maux ; Kunreuther ). Governments do
seem to find risk-based pricing challenging to implement in the
absence of independent public or private institutions empowered to
implement it (Cummins and Mahul ).
One further argument for risk transfer, so far inadequately
researched, is as a commitment device—that is, a way in which govern-
ment can commit itself to data systems and rules for how money will
flow after a disaster, protect the system against discretion and fraud,
and protect public policy from the dilemma of time inconsistency as
discussed in Chapter . The use of financial instruments as commit-
ment devices is not new and is, for example, the main explanation for
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the success of commitment savings products observed across devel-
oping countries (Armendáriz and Morduch ). In the case of
disaster risk financing, this rationale has been argued by practitioners
such as the World Bank (a) and Phaup and Kirschner (), but
as yet there has been no empirical analysis of its merits.
Three arguments are commonly made against government engaging
with regulated risk-transfer providers for the joint management of
disaster risk: () the provider may risk insolvency (Charpentier and Le
Maux ); () for catastrophe risk that is difficult to quantify, regulated
risk-transfer providers may not be able to offer attractive prices (Carter
; Kunreuther ); and () government may face a lack of compe-
tition (von Ungern-Sternberg ).
A variety of arguments have also been made for government
providing subsidies or making insurance compulsory. Hill et al.
() and Carter et al. () argue that subsidies for agricultural
insurance can be designed to correct a clearly stated and well-
documented market failure or equity concern. This argument builds
on a number of careful impact evaluations of index insurance pro-
grammes for farmers, which support, in turn, the argument that
credible indexed protection can instil good incentives for climate-
smart, risk-sensitive investments. For example, Karlan et al. (),
Mobarak and Rosenzweig (), Janzen and Carter (), and
Elabed and Carter () all find that index insurance significantly
boosts investment or reduces asset decumulation. However, demand
for insurance from farmers is still quite low in the absence of subsidies
(see, for example, Cole et al. ) and quite sensitive to recent experi-
ence (Cole et al. ).
The low penetration of disaster insurance is, however, not restricted
to agricultural insurance in developing countries. In the absence of
subsidies, Pomeroy () reports that only  per cent of home-
owners’ policies in California include earthquake insurance despite
the compulsory offer rule whereby any insurer who sells home-
owners’ insurance must explicitly give clients the option to include
earthquake insurance in their policy. Kunreuther and Pauly ()
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point to the fact that only  per cent of the residents of Orleans
Parish had flood insurance before Hurricane Katrina slammed into
New Orleans in . They propose compulsory but subsidized
insurance for homeowners as a policy option, motivating the argu-
ments of Jaffee and Russell ().
A wide range of practical experience around the world in designing
and implementing credible ex ante financial plans for disasters is
documented. A rich literature has emerged in the United States,
stimulated by the rapid growth in federal government involvement
in financial protection against disasters (see, for example, Kunreuther
and Michel-Kerjan ) and in developing countries (Gurenko et al.
; Cummins and Mahul ; World Bank a; ).
McCulloch et al. () consider the potential application of disaster
risk financing solutions by humanitarian actors and microfinance
institutions, and Mahul and Stutley () and Carter et al. ()
provide recent analyses of the conceptual and practical opportunities
and challenges for government support of agricultural insurance.
Private-sector risk carriers regularly produce research on the global
market for disaster risk transfer, some of which is publicly available
(see, for example, Swiss Re ).
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MOVING FORWARD . . .
The evidence is still growing, but what is already clear is that a betterway of dealing with disasters is possible. Three things are essential:
a coordinated plan for post-disaster action agreed in advance; a fast,
evidence-based decision-making process; and a funding model, based
on risk financing principles, to credibly lock in the plan and rules.
Why Are We Even Talking about This?
Disaster losses are huge, averaging US$–$ billion a year,
according to the United Nations. The number of deaths, serious
injuries, and health issues arising from disasters climbs into the hun-
dreds of thousands each year. Losses are trending up, partly from
economic growth and urbanization and partly from climate change—
but also because development is often not carried out in a risk-
informed way. Cities are built along fault lines; schools are erected
without regard to the most basic building codes; roads are constructed
in areas where they will be washed away by a minor flood; and houses
are built on flood plains.
Earthquakes, droughts, floods, storms, and epidemics are natural
events, but the number of deaths or the amount of damage depends
on the actions of individuals and governments both before and after
those events. When extreme natural events turn into disasters, the
response from governments and the international community is often
generous. This generosity is driven in part by the feeling that it is right
and proper to support disaster victims and in part by the recognition
that it makes for good politics. In fact, disaster relief is often a media
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election years—and it makes for good press releases by international
donors.
The actual response to a disaster, however, is typically too late, too
fragmented, and too unreliable. This is begging-bowl financing at its
worst, with farmers, homeowners, and local governments pleading for
help from the national government, and the national government
making appeals to international donor governments and other bene-
factors. What does all this mean? Planning for disaster response does
not begin in earnest until after the disaster, and that is too late. Nobody
works out whowill dowhat andwhowill pay for what until the crisis is
unfolding, leading to a fragmented, inefficient response. And if media
or political attention moves elsewhere, or if national governments or
international donors have already spent their annual disaster contin-
gency budgets, what help is received may not be enough.
The ambiguity over who will be generous, for what, and how much
they will contribute produces poor incentives for planning. Why
would a local government take time and care to prepare a serious
disaster plan if it is not clear whether it will be funded or implemented
by the central government until after the event? Why would a gov-
ernment in a poor country set up response mechanisms beforehand if
it is unclear whether the funding will arrive to implement those
mechanisms, or, even when it does come, whether the benefactor
will want to decide what to spend it on? Ambiguity also leads to a
system with extremely poor incentives for risk reduction. Why would
a municipal government invest in hospitals if the national government
could always be persuaded to pay for most of any disaster-related
damage? Why would a homeowner buy disaster insurance or invest in
a home away from the flood plain if compensation is paid for every
flood? Why would farmers invest in better water management if
agricultural loans are cancelled whenever there is a minor drought?
Why would a government invest in alternative livelihood opportun-
ities in drought-prone areas if donors will bail them out when there is
a serious drought?
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What Is the Solution?
There is nothing wrong with funding for disasters based on generos-
ity. Indeed, it is to be applauded. However, it is much better for
generous governments and donors to acknowledge and clarify their
generosity before any disaster—that is, for benefactors to become
leaders. They should be clear about what risk they own and what
risk belongs to others.
What does this mean for planning? It means thinking and preparing
like an insurance company. It means being upfront about who or
what governments and their partners will protect and against what,
how much others will have to pay, and what the conditions for
protection will be. It means getting the right professionals in the
room, working with each other and political leaders to develop a
credible plan. It means investing in risk information to inform plans
and in risk communication so that everyone understands the potential
threat from natural hazards and values the protection being offered. It
means investing in fraud-resistant data systems that can trigger auto-
matic post-disaster action, turning early warning into early action. It
means building up implementation capabilities so that relief and
reconstruction can be implemented like clockwork. And it means
working with bureaucrats to provide guidance on the thorny trade-
offs over who or what to protect and with financial experts to
assemble budgetary and financial instruments that credibly commit
them to the plan.
All this is challenging, but it is possible. And it is already starting.
Efforts are under way around the world to toss out the begging bowl
and turn benefactors into leaders. Learning from the response to the
Ebola outbreak and from responding to various recent natural disas-
ters, international organizations and think tanks are changing their
approaches to disasters so they can achieve better decision making
and preparedness, and they are offering proposals, some consistent
with ours. More pre-disaster financing instruments are becoming
available.
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Nevertheless, most of the innovation is at the national level, where
governments have begun to develop well-defined, pre-financed plans
that will be implemented in the event of a disaster. These plans are not
designed to cover everything that may be needed in the aftermath of a
disaster, but they are simple enough for political leaders to commu-
nicate to their constituents—even in a sound bite if they must. No
vague statements are made that all needing help will be covered.
Rather, a credible commitment is made to responding decisively to
protect pre-identified people or property in a specific way against
specific perils. And countries are locked in using financial instruments,
so that in the event of a disaster those instruments can be imple-
mented quickly and decisively without any need for further debate or
deliberation from political leaders. Where changes have been carefully
evaluated, big improvements in response times and outcomes are
evident.
What Are the Challenges?
Four challenges stand out. If governments and their partners do not
address each of these attempts to move away from the begging
bowl, planning will be futile—just another bureaucratic exercise to
gather dust in someone’s drawer. It is best, then, to address these four
challenges head-on.
Making Difficult Pre-Disaster Trade-offs
Neither national governments nor international donors can afford to
protect everyone against every possible disaster. For that reason, the
difficult trade-offs should be made before disasters. Trade-offs are not
easy, but they are already being made implicitly in the current system.
Making explicit trade-offs before a disaster allows proper planning and
instils good incentives in the system, but political leaders will need
help in developing plans that can be sold to their constituencies.
The foundations of a credible plan could be an existing social safety
net with the commitment, financing arrangements, and logistics to
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 31/3/2016, SPi
DU L L D I S A S T E R S ?

expand it to a well-defined broader group when an extreme event of
an intensity that would trigger an automatic response takes place. The
social safety net could expect certain actions by those who would be
part of the expanded coverage, such as registering before the event and
perhaps making a financial contribution or taking some actions at the
local community level to increase resilience to a crisis. Kenya’s Hunger
Safety Net Programme is a good example of such a plan.
A credible plan for response and recovery after a storm or earth-
quake could specify how repairs to public infrastructure will be
triggered and prioritized (with the financing plan agreed beforehand)
and how for a specified period those who lost homes or livelihoods
would be supported. It could also specify that homeowners would be
expected to pay part of the cost of disaster insurance, which is
conditional on following a basic building code if they want to be
eligible for government support to rebuild their houses afterwards.
Mexico’s National Disaster Fund (FONDEN) offers such a plan for
public infrastructure.
Once there is clarity on who is being protected and against what
and on who is paying, there may be difficult trade-offs over who will
implement what. Again, this is difficult but necessary if the objective is
coordinated, not fragmented, implementation.
Providing Protection, Not Relief
There is much political capital to be gained from being a benefactor. In
fact, research on evidence-based electoral politics suggests that politi-
cians have far more to win from focusing on disaster relief than on
risk reduction and response preparation. But that does not bode well
for planners setting out to convince politicians to come on board. So
how can planners make their proposals politically attractive?
The trick is to help politicians explain to their constituents that
planning is the route to providing protection: investing now, not just
offering relief when things go wrong. By communicating the idea of
protection, a politician can clarify what risk the government or agency
owns and what risk it does not. Disaster relief is attractive politics, and
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so the professionals must help political leaders ensure that protection
becomes good politics, too.
Selling the focus on protection will be easier when the electorate
and commerce are well informed about the future disaster risk. If
nobody understands disaster risk, a political statement that people
are protected will not be politically cost-effective, even if the benefits
for people and the economy are overwhelming.
In some countries, better responses over time have become the
norm following better preparedness and planning. For example, over
many decades Japan has become a success story in which science has
infused the public consciousness and led to good planning. The
Japanese model offers strong motivation for investing in the commu-
nication of disaster risk information at all levels of society so that
better, smarter, disaster risk management solutions are politically
sellable and sustainable.
Getting Others to Pay Their Share
Governments and international donors should aim for coordinated,
pre-financed defined plans, with clear responsibilities for coordinated
implementation and a credible joint financing strategy, and not the
current myriad of initiatives. Each country could have a small number
of well-defined plans for different key risks, or one generic plan that
can be adapted for different risks. For some risks, such as pandemics, a
plan covering multiple countries may be appropriate. To make this
work, all parties will have to be tied to the mast like Odysseus, and that
will not be easy (see Chapter ).
A requirement will be political courage and commitment by the
key players involved. Indeed, politicians will have to care—for their
people, for the poor—for all this to work. Leadership from a few
important benefactors could go a long way towards changing the
incentives of everyone else in the system, showcasing how contrib-
uting to defined, credible plans could be an attractive strategy
for others. Governments and donors should not be shy about
offering funding for precise plans conditional on others providing
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co-financing, or plans in which they publicly announce that they
will match contributions from others. Multilateral agencies such as
the World Bank are already facilitating such co-financing solutions
when they implement shock-responsive social safety nets financed
through concessionary lines of credit. In such arrangements, the
government pays part of the full economic cost and donors finance
the remainder. It is hoped that more examples of this kind of
scheme appear, with governments taking clear ownership of such
arrangements. This is the trajectory for schemes such as Ethiopia’s
Productive Safety Net Programme and Kenya’s Hunger Safety Net
Programme.
Learning by Doing and Having a Backup
The evidence for changing the funding model and moving towards
pre-financed, precise, credible plans is overwhelming. However, the
evidence on what plans should look like is still emerging. Professionals
will have to work together to put sensible, country-specific or
problem-specific plans together and will need to learn by doing.
At the same time, dogma cannot replace reason. Rules-based plans
sometimes go wrong, and reality sometimes takes even the most
careful planners by surprise. For example, a precise plan might be
designed for a drought and then there would be a flood.
For unforeseen events, national relief financed by begging bowls
and the international humanitarian system, with their post-disaster
assessment and principled deliberation, is actually the appropriate
system to serve as a catch-all back-up. It is not, however, the best
solution for natural hazards for which one can reasonably plan,
because it asks for leadership too late, does not lead to a fast, coord-
inated response, and does not promote good incentives for risk
reduction. Arrangements that target pre-disaster protection are better
where possible, but arrangements that target post-disaster need are
useful as a back-up. And the more the financing of this back-up can
be pre-arranged between willing contributors, with clear rules and
commitments, the more effective the back-up.
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Getting Started: Taking the First Steps
The process begins with generous people owning up to and clarifying
their generosity before a disaster. Here are some steps that could offer
a starting point.
First, one or more benefactors would lead the shift from begging
bowls to well-defined, credible plans and would provide financial and
political incentives for others to jointly pay into the plans. These
benefactors could be national leaders, embracing precise plans as a
way to give them more predictability about post-disaster support
from donors and subnational governments and to promote good
incentives for people and firms. Or they could be international leaders,
as contributors to the humanitarian system, seeking to move away
from a system filled with procrastination, appeals, and post-disaster
strategic manoeuvring and towards a system in which their political
contract with other governments and people is clarified in a way that
promotes good incentives to invest in risk reduction. Or it could be a
combination of national and international leaders.
Second, national governments would own the development of
precise, credible plans as part of an iterative dialogue with risk mod-
ellers, communicators, implementers, bureaucrats, and financiers.
This process would best be led by government, but in collaboration
with others in order to work jointly towards a more efficient, faster,
and less costly system to address disaster risks, including response
preparedness but also risk reduction. Politicians will need to find ways
to clarify to their citizens what the protection offered will entail. They
will also have to specify the efforts government, firms, and citizens
would be expected to make to ensure that development is more risk-
sensitive and resilient.
Third, implementing agencies would change the ways in which they
plan. This means actively engaging with others to develop well-defined,
credible plans that have political buy-in and are fully financed up front,
and then to ensure that there will be the capacity to implement them.
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And they should be willing to agree on coordination, decision, and
implementation structures beforehand.
Finally, financiers would need to be at the table from the start to
help design, cost, and implement disaster risk financing strategies
for pre-financing these well-defined plans. They should also help
advise on the balance between risk retention and risk transfer in the
funding of the plans. Crucially, as explained in Chapter , they should
help all contributors to the plan move towards pre-disaster financing
instruments—that is, from emergency budget reallocations, emergency
debt issuance, and begging bowls towards well-managed reserve funds,
lines of contingent credit, and the plethora of insurance and reinsurance
instruments that are currently available on the market or through
regional organizations such as the Caribbean Community, Pacific Com-
munity, and African Union.
Dulling Disasters, Now!
This is a good time to prepare better for disasters and sort out their
financing. Humanitarian disasters are unacceptable across the world,
and, faced with forecasts of a rising number of extreme events, the
world should be better prepared to offer reasonable protection at the
lowest possible cost. But much work has yet to be done. Globally,
nationally, and locally, as governments or as part of the global
humanitarian system, benefactors of all stripes would do well to
think and act more like insurance and reinsurance companies. Each
actor should define better who and what it will protect—and rebuild
the system from these contingent liabilities and their gaps.
Today’s disasters need leaders and humanitarians who do not just
respond emotionally and energetically to crises, but who plan before-
hand with clear and strong commitment devices, using political, legal,
and financial mechanisms based on specific triggers for action and
financing. Learning from research and resisting the song of the Sirens,
they can make sure the system works. The new approach may result in
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less airtime for disasters, appeals, emotions, and adrenaline, and more
tutorials on the principles of insurance. By dulling disasters—as in
making them less intense—we may make them a little dull and boring
as well. But that will be worth it.
Recapping . . .
. Discretionary begging-bowl financing does not work well for
disasters. It is too slow, leads to a fragmented response, and
encourages underinvestment in risk reduction and preparedness.
. To get around this problem, generous people and their political
leaders should own up to and clarify who or what they will
protect and against what and how much others will have to pay.
They should be willing to think as if they are an insurance
company.
. This means making trade-offs over who or what to protect before
disasters. This process is not easy, but it is necessary for a system
with good incentives.
. Leaders should focus on providing protection, not relief, and
using financial incentives to encourage others to own up to
and finance their share up front.
. The international humanitarian system is still needed, but it
should act as a back-up when plans fail. It should not be the
first line of defence for floods, earthquakes, droughts, storms,
or pandemics.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 31/3/2016, SPi
DU L L D I S A S T E R S ?

GLOSSARY
area average index An index
calculated as the area average
mean economic loss. It is calculated
either as a population mean or as a
sample mean. For example, the
average crop yield for maize in a
subdistrict as measured by a series
of statistical samples of crop yield is
a type of area yield index.
attribution error A cognitive bias
whereby people erroneously
attribute their own or someone
else’s behaviour to a certain cause.
In the context of disaster risk
management, voters may make
attribution errors by attributing
investments in preparedness
expenditures to future government




discretionary ex post model for
funding losses. In the case of
disaster risk, beneficiaries such as
individuals, communities, local
and national governments,
international agencies, and non-
governmental organizations would
be required to wait until after a
disaster to request, negotiate, and
secure funding from benefactors.
benefactor An individual or
institution that retains discretion
until after a disaster over what it
will fund, rather than agreeing
before a disaster what it will fund.
budget allocation An amount of
funding set aside to cover specific
planned expenditures. In the
context of disaster risk
management, a budget allocation
can be made so that it can be
accessed only in the event of a
disaster.
capital base Money contributed by
the shareholders who first
purchased shares in a company
plus retained earnings.
capital market instrument Any
financial contract that can be
structured to act in the same way as
reinsurance, but with investors, not
necessarily reinsurers, providing the
protection. Examples are catastrophe
bonds and catastrophe swaps.
catastrophe bond An insurance-linked
security in which payment of interest
and/or principal is suspended or
cancelled in the event of a specified
catastrophe such as an earthquake.
catastrophe swap A contract used by
investors to exchange (swap) a fixed
payment for a certain portion of the
difference between insurance
premiums and claims.
contingency fund A reserve fund
designated for financing disaster
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losses. Allocations to the
contingency fund can be made
through budget allocations of the
national or local governments,
international agencies, communities,
or a combination of these. Funds are
made available immediately after a
disaster and are disbursed using clear
and simple rules.
contingent credit A financial tool
that provides governments with
immediate access to funds
following disaster events to
enable a more rapid and efficient
response. This type of financing
is typically used to finance losses
caused by recurrent natural
disasters. A line of contingent
credit is an ex ante instrument that
allows borrowers to prepare for a
natural disaster by securing access
to financing before a disaster
strikes.
contingent liability A potential
future expenditure. In the case of
disaster risk, a government or
organization’s contingent liability is
a random variable denoting the
liability contingent on potential
disaster events.
disaster risk finance The financial
protection of populations against
disaster events. Disaster risk finance
strategies increase the ability of
national and local governments,
homeowners, businesses,
agricultural producers, and low-
income populations to respond
more quickly and resiliently to
disasters.
disaster risk management The
systematic process of using
administrative directives,
organizations, and operational
skills and capacities to implement
strategies, policies, and improved
coping capacities in order to lessen
the adverse impacts of hazards and
the possibility of disaster.
disaster risk reduction The concept
and practice of reducing disaster
risks through systematic efforts to
analyse and manage the causal
factors of disasters, including
through reduced exposure to
hazards, reduced vulnerability of
people and property, wise
management of land and the
environment, and improved
preparedness for adverse events.
emergency recovery phase The
disaster response phase that follows
the emergency relief phase. During
recovery, initial relief efforts have
been completed; typically people
have access to food, water, and
temporary shelter, and children are
able to attend school. The recovery
phase can last several weeks or
months, depending on the initial
situation of the country.
emergency relief phase The disaster
response phase that begins
immediately after a disaster. During
the emergency relief phase, key
objectives include ensuring food
security, shelter, and medical care.
The duration of the relief phase
depends on the initial situation of
the country following the disaster
event.
ex ante Latin for ‘from before’. In the
context of disaster events, ex ante
instruments are arranged before the
event, and ex ante decisions are
made at that time as well.
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ex post Latin for ‘from after’. In the
context of disaster events, ex post
instruments are arranged after the
event, and ex post decisions are
made at that time as well.




humanitarian assistance is provided
when local and national resources
are insufficient to meet the needs of
the affected population.
hidden action Within a principal
agent problem, the case in which
the principal cannot observe the
behaviour of the agent. Hidden
action is a type of informational
asymmetry. See moral hazard.
humanitarian aid In general terms,
the aid and action designed to save
lives, alleviate suffering, and
maintain and protect human
dignity during and after man-made
crises and natural disasters. Such
aid may also be used to prevent and
strengthen preparedness for the
occurrence of such situations.
indemnity insurance An insurance
policy that pays claims based on the
actual economic losses incurred by
the policyholder.
index insurance An insurance
policy that pays claims based on
an index. Indexes are typically
chosen to be a good proxy of the
economic losses incurred by the
policyholder.
individual loss adjustment The
process by which a loss adjuster
objectively assesses the actual
damage for each insured building
or injured person.
moral hazard In insurance, the
problems generated when the
insured’s behaviour can influence
the extent of damage that qualifies
for insurance payouts. Examples of
moral hazard are carelessness,
fraudulent claims, and
irresponsibility.
natural disaster An extreme event
leading to loss of lives and
livelihoods caused by natural
hazards such as tropical cyclones,
earthquakes, floods, and landslides.
parametric insurance A type of
insurance that does not indemnify
the pure loss but ex ante agrees to
make a payment upon occurrence
of a triggering event. The triggering
event is often a catastrophic natural
event, which may cause a loss.
post-disaster needs assessment A
government-led exercise that
assesses post-disaster needs with
a view towards providing a
platform for the international
community to assist the affected
government in recovery and
reconstruction.
public financial management Steps
taken to ensure that money is spent
and accounted for in a clear and






Public Health Emergency of
International Concern As defined
in the International Health
Regulations, ‘an extraordinary
event which is determined to
constitute a public health risk to
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other States through the
international spread of disease and
to potentially require a coordinated
international response’.
reinsurance A practice in which
insurers transfer portions of
risk portfolios to other parties
in order to reduce the likelihood
of having to pay a large
obligation resulting from
an insurance claim—that is, it is
insurance of insurance.
risk-based pricing Pricing of an
insurance policy to reflect the
underlying risk that is transferred
through the insurance contract.
risk pool An arrangement whereby
several individuals, companies, or
countries jointly insure against a
certain pre-specified risk.
risk-retention instrument An
instrument whereby a party retains
the financial responsibility for loss
in the event of a shock. Risk-
retention instruments do not take
risk off the balance sheet—the cost
of a disaster must still be repaid.
The instrument just offers more
flexibility in how and when one
would have to pay. Contingency
funds, budget allocations, and lines
of contingent credit are all risk-
retention instruments, as are budget
reallocations, tax increases, and
post-disaster credit.
risk-transfer instrument An
instrument, such as an insurance
contract, that passes on the risks
associated with a certain event from
one party to another. For example,
in disaster insurance the financial
risks associated with a disaster
event are passed from the insured
to the insurer.
shock-responsive social protection
Social protection that has the ability
to increase its caseload and/or its
intensity of support in response to
catastrophic events.
status quo bias The tendency of
people not to change what they are
doing unless the incentive to do so
is strong.
targeting The process of selecting
beneficiaries under a social safety
net programme.
trigger The event that must occur
before a particular insurance policy
applies to a given loss. For example,
for weather-index insurance a
trigger could be the weather
measurement that causes the
insurance policy to pay out, such as
a certain amount of cumulative
rainfall.
underwriting The process of issuing
an insurance policy, thereby
accepting a liability and
guaranteeing payment in case a loss
occurs.
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. Data on the exact impacts of disasters are always questionable, but various
broadly reliable estimates exist. The data quoted here are from the EM-DAT
(Emergency Events Database), <http://www.emdat.be>; Government of Haiti
(); Government of Nepal (); Government of Pakistan (); and
Swiss Re (). Germanwatch () and UNISDR () offer global esti-
mates and discuss patterns of damage and loss of life.
. In Somalia, it was not just the drought that mattered. The drought that
peaked in  killed tens of thousands in a large-scale famine that received
a poor response. Some have suggested that up to , may have died,
half of these young children (Checchi and Robinson ). But its impact was
even more devastating because of the conflict raging in the country. Indeed,
the droughts with the most devastating impacts in recent decades also took
place during conflicts: for example, the drought and famine in Ethiopia in
– killed between , and a million people and caused long-term
damage to people and their livelihoods (Dercon and Porter ). Other
examples are Darfur in the s, Ethiopia in , and China (Henan) in
 or during the Great Leap Forward in –. The latter remains the
largest famine in the last century; more than  million people died from
starvation. It was a sign of progress in the latter half of the twentieth century
that harvest failures only resulted in famines (defined as large-scale excess
mortality) during conflict or serious political repression. See, for example, de
Waal () on Darfur in the s, Wolde Mariam () on Ethiopia in
–, and Mitter () on Henan, China, in –.
. Hallegatte et al. ().
. As of  December , the World Health Organization reported ,
deaths in these three countries. See <http://apps.who.int/ebola/ebola-
situation-reports>.
. In this book, we use the shorthand ‘natural disasters’ to refer to disasters
caused by extreme natural hazards. We recognize that extreme natural
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hazards do not need to cause disasters and that human behaviour can
increase or lessen the impact of these natural hazards (World Bank ).
. More formal definitions are possible. ALNAP (: ) refers to the ‘network
of interconnected institutional and operational entities through which
humanitarian assistance is provided when local and national resources are
insufficient to meet the needs of the affected population’, and includes as
actors UN humanitarian agencies, the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement, recipient government agencies, humanitarian arms of
regional intergovernmental organizations, donor governments, and local,
national, and international NGOs.
. Details can be found in ALNAP, UKAid, and UNEG ().
. See IASC ().
. IASC () discusses this in more detail.
. More details can be found in Congressional Research Service () and
Department of Homeland Security ().
. Many reports and analyses are devoted to discussing ‘what went wrong’ during
the responses to disasters. A poorly planned and coordinated response is a
common theme. Well-documented cases are the response to the  Haiti
earthquake—see, for example, ALNAP, UKAid, and UNEG ()—or the
response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines—see IASC ().
. Strömberg (); World Bank (a).
. See Congressional Research Service () and Department of Homeland
Security ().
. Slater and Bhuvanendra (); Jensen et al. ().
. Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery ().
. Hoddinott et al. (); Slater and Bhuvanendra ().
. UNISDR ().
. According to Germanwatch (), in terms of extreme weather events poor
developing countries are the most affected. Between  and , Hon-
duras, Myanmar, and Haiti were the countries that suffered the most from
extreme weather events. In  the Philippines, Cambodia, and India led the
list of such countries. Of the ten most affected countries from  to ,
nine were in the low-income or lower-middle-income country group, while
only one was classified as an upper-middle-income country.
Chapter 
. The BBC website <http://www.bbc.com> stated on  April  that ‘a
major earthquake has struck Nepal’, ‘hundreds of people are feared dead’,
and ‘the government has declared a state of emergency in the affected areas’.
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Soon the first appeals for assistance were heard. ‘We need support from the
various international agencies which are more knowledgeable and equipped
to handle the kind of emergency we face now’, said the Nepali information
minister. Time magazine ran an article on  April entitled ‘ Ways You Can
Give to Nepal Earthquake Relief ’, giving details on six international charities.
By  April, the BBC website was reporting more detailed estimates of
damage and loss of lives: ‘Officials say Saturday’s quake killed more than
, people, and injured at least ,. The UN says more than eight
million people have been affected by Saturday’s .-magnitude quake and
some , houses have been destroyed.’ And the main appeal was
reported: ‘The UN has appealed for $m (£m) to help provide emer-
gency relief over the next three months.’
. On the  April, the BBC website reported that ‘the [Nepali] government says
it has been overwhelmed by the disaster’. By  April, the first fallout had
begun: Timemagazine reported under the headline ‘Why Nepal Wasn’t Ready
for the Earthquake’. Documenting poor regulation and poor politics, it stated,
‘People have been trying for a long time to improve preparedness and
resilience, but they’re resource-strapped.’ By  April, the BBC website was
reporting that ‘survivors in some areas told the BBC that they were angry that
neither food nor medicine has reached them’.
. Clarke and Hill (); Cabot Venton et al. ().
. Data from the Financial Tracking Service of the UN’s Office for Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) suggested that in December  there were
twenty-four live appeals for Humanitarian Response Plans, as well as six
Refugee Response Plans and a number of flash appeals. The total appeals
were for just under US$ billion, of which just  per cent were either paid
or committed via pledges by donors. Several of the largest involved conflict-
related crises (such as Syria or the Democratic Republic of Congo), but large
appeals also included the Nepal earthquake ($ million, of which $
million has been unmet), and more than $. billion in total for Burkina Faso,
Mali, Chad, and Niger, much of it related to drought, floods, and other
extreme events. Of that $. billion, $ million was unmet.
. See Congressional Research Service () or Department of Homeland
Security ().
. WHO ().
. Kucharski et al. ().
. Procrastination could be related to different cognitive biases commonly
found in people (Samuelson and Zeckhauser ). Ritov and Baron ()
distinguish between status quo bias (explained by loss aversion) and
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omission bias (explained by a failure to act, which arises through a failure
to see the possibility of action). See <https://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/
ocha_R_Y_asof____December__(_).pdf>. O’Donoghue
and Rabin () discuss explanations linked to self-control problems.
. Bailey ().
. For example, on  June , Reuters reported, ‘Worst drought in  years
hitting Horn of Africa: U.N.’. The UK’s Channel  news website stated, ‘East
African drought worst in  years’. On  October , the Independent in
the UK wrote, ‘Africa’s worst drought in  years threatens famine . . . ’.
. Bailey ().
. See Sen () for an early articulation or Sen () for a recent discussion.
Sen suggested that the – famine during the Great Leap Forward in
China happened because news was repressed, and so news of the famine did
not even reach the top party leadership. India has been able to avoid
famines since independence because a free press and the pressures of
elections have meant that politicians have been held accountable for
responding to disasters.
. Besley and Burgess ().
. Sainath ().
. Cole et al. ().
. Gasper and Reeves (); Reeves ().
. Healy and Malhotra ().
. Rutherford ().
. Rutherford ().
. Dercon et al. ().
. Historically, fire insurance was also the first commercial product targeting
households to emerge. A few years after the catastrophicGreat Fire of London
in , the Insurance Office for Houses, probably the first fire-insurance
company, was founded. It was set up as a mutual fund, pooling the contribu-
tions of its members, with payouts further guaranteed by a property-
investment portfolio. Recognizing the benefits of preparedness, this company
and its fast-emerging competitors ended up setting up the first fire brigades,
offering protection to the properties they insured and only those.
Chapter 
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. Kucharski et al. ().
. Clarke and Hill (). Cabot Venton et al. () suggest even higher figures
for Ethiopia and double the cost of a late response in Kenya compared with
an early response.
. Tversky and Kahneman () first suggested that this is a cognitive bias,
resulting in deviations in rational decision making.
. ‘Build back better’ is now recognized as good practice globally, having
gained momentum following the  Indian Ocean tsunami and as one
of the four priorities for action under the Sendai Framework for Disaster
Risk Reduction.
. For a review of health interventions during humanitarian interventions, see
Blanchet et al. (). Of the  studies of sufficient quality that could be
included, only  per cent took place in the settings of disasters caused by
natural events.
. For one recent review of the challenges of—but also opportunities for—
better evaluations in humanitarian settings, see Puri et al. ().
. Financial contracts are not always necessary. One informative counterexam-
ple is Japan, where the government signed a contingent service contract
with a construction company for post-disaster reconstruction. Through this
and similar contracts, key highways were rebuilt within two weeks of the
Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami in .
. See de Janvry et al. ().
Chapter 
. Trenerry ().
. Rutherford (); Dercon et al. (); Roth (); Thomson and Posel
().
. Madrian and Shea () show this for US retirement savings products.
. Bryan et al. ().
. Samuelson and Zeckhauser ().
. Madrian and Shea ().
. Thaler and Sunstein (); Goldstein et al. ().
. Simon (); Kahneman (); Thaler and Sunstein ().
. Gigerenzer and Goldstein ().
. An alternative approach would be to use rules to trigger financing but leave
the prioritization until after the disaster—for example, to be decided under a
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clear accountability and decision-making framework using information
from a Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA).
. Dercon ().
. A careful review of the relevant evidence that comes out in strong support of
using more cash in humanitarian aid is Overseas Development Institute and
Centre for Global Development ().
. Some issues have to be monitored when moving to cash. One is that cash
transfers retain their value. Therefore, if prices increase, the value of the
transfers needs to be adjusted in a reasonable way to keep purchasing power
constant. Also, food supplies need to be guaranteed, but this is about
monitoring markets and potentially promoting or supporting imports, not
necessarily delivering food to people directly.
. For example, the Japanese earthquake and tsunami early warning system
saved thousands of lives in the aftermath of the  Tōhoku earthquake and
tsunami by enabling high-speed trains to be slowed so that they did not
derail, dangerous machinery to be shut off so it did not cause damage, and
people to find cover or move to high ground so they were not injured or




. For some of the experiences related to RISEPAK during the  Kashmir





. World Bank ().
. A reinsurance policy is essentially an insurance policy for insurers.
A catastrophe bond is an insurance-linked security in which payment of
interest or principal is suspended or cancelled in the event of a specified
catastrophe, such as an earthquake.
. Munich Re ().
. Beyond insurance, there are other insights from finance that are relevant to
financial planning for disasters. For example, if a plan requires delivering
grain to drought-stricken individuals it would be important to manage both
price and quantity risks. Price risk is typically best implemented through
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dynamic financial management where a portfolio of financial instruments is
actively rebalanced as time passes and prices change to hedge the price risk.
. For a more comprehensive description of financial and budgetary instru-
ments available to governments for financing disaster risk, see Cummins
and Mahul ().
. Authors’ calculations based on data from the Financial Tracking Service
(FTS) of the UN’s Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(OCHA), <https://fts.unocha.org>.
. Insurance and reinsurance prices are typically the result of a negotiation.
Risk-reduction investments will not automatically reduce the cost of insur-
ance and reinsurance, but, if well explained in these negotiations, they
should typically result in premium reductions.
. Captive insurance companies are insurance companies established by a
parent company with the specific objective of covering the risks to which
the parent is exposed.
. For the general principle, see Arrow (); for the case of disaster risk
financing for governments, see Clarke et al. ().
. Jensen et al. ().
. Hoddinott et al. ().
. Cabinet Decree No.  of June ,  (Panama), Supreme Decree --
Housing (Peru), and Article , paragraph  of Law  of  (Colombia).
. Specific examples are France’s Catastrophe Naturelles, the Japanese Earth-
quake Reinsurance Company, the New Zealand Earthquake Commission,
Norway’s Norsk Naturskadepool, Spain’s Consorcio de Compensacion de
Seguros, the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, the Hawaii Hurricane
Relief Fund, the California Earthquake Authority, the Taiwan Residential
Earthquake Insurance Pool, and the Turkish Catastrophic Insurance Pool
(TCIP). See Cummins and Mahul ().
. Following the  Christchurch earthquake, which caused about US$
billion in insured losses, the government of New Zealand injected further
capital into the New Zealand Earthquake Commission, an earthquake
reinsurer guaranteed by the government, to enable it to pay about half of
the total claims (see <http://www.eqc.govt.nz/canterbury-earthquakes/
progress-updates/scorecard>). It also bailed out the second-largest insurance
company in the country, AMI Insurance (Muir-Wood ). Following
Hurricane Wilma, which struck Florida in , the Poe Financial Group
declared insolvency, and claims had to be paid by the state-sponsored
reinsurer, the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, and by the state-sponsored
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insurer of last resort, the Citizens Property Insurance Company (Linnerooth-
Bayer et al. ).
. Mahul and Stutley ().
. There are some exceptions, however. The Turkish government established a
compulsory, unsubsidized earthquake insurance pool for homeowners’
buildings, and the combination of compulsion and clever, well-funded
awareness-raising has led to some . million buildings being insured
(TCIP ) out of a total of . billion, with owners paying the full cost
of earthquake insurance themselves (Turkish Statistical Institute ).
. Cat DDOs are in place in ten countries for a total value of US$. billion: $
million to the Seychelles in ; $ million to Sri Lanka in ; $
million to Colombia in ; $million to El Salvador in ; $million
to Panama in ; $ million to the Philippines in ; $ million to
Peru in ; $ million to Guatemala in ; $ million to Colombia
in ; and $ million to Costa Rica in .
. The premium for Haiti was paid for the – season through a grant
provided by the Caribbean Development Bank. All other Caribbean coun-
tries paid the full premium themselves. Nicaragua paid the premium
through a concessionary loan from the International Development Associ-
ation (IDA), the World Bank fund for the poorest countries. Since its
inception, CCRIF has paid thirteen claims totalling US$ million.
. For –, the Cook Islands, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Samoa,
Tonga, and Vanuatu all purchased parametric catastrophe insurance cover-
age against major tropical cyclones and earthquakes (including tsunami).
Since its inception, the PCRAFI has paid two claims totalling US$.million.
. For –, Kenya, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal all purchased parametric
insurance coverage against drought. Since its inception, the ARC has paid
three claims totalling US$ million.
. UN OCHA FTS data.
. Murtaza ().
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commitment , , –, , , 
commitment devices , , , –, 
communication
inter-agency 
of scientific findings 
compulsory insurance , , 
confirmation bias 
conflict/conflict-induced crises ,  n. ,
 n. 
contingency budgets , , 
contingency funds , , , , , ,
–
contingent credit , , , , 
contingent debt facilities 
contingent liability –, , –, ,
, 
contract theory 
Cook Islands  n. 
coordination , , , , , , 
coordination failures –, , , 
Costa Rica  n. 
credit, post–disaster 
crisis management, three C’s of 
crop insurance , 
crying wolf –
Cummins, J. David , 
cyclones ,  n. 
Patricia, Mexico () 
Cyprus 
Darfur  n. 
data systems –, 
credibility of 
and disaster insurance –
early warning , 
gaming of , 
user-generated 







and present bias 
rules-based , , , –, –, 
and status quo bias –
transparency 
delayed response , , –
Democratic Republic of Congo ,  n. 
Dercon, Stefan ,  n. 
development banks , 
de Waal, Alex  n. 
Dhaka, Bangladesh –
disaster relief , –, , , –,
–
disaster risk finance , 
disaster risk management , , 
disaster risk reduction , –, –, , ,
, , , , 
incentives –, –, , , , ,
, 
underinvestment in , , 
drought , , , , , , , , ,
 n. 
Ethiopia , , , ,  n. 
insurance , , 
Kenya , , ,  n. 
Somalia () , , ,  n. 
early action , , –, , 
early warning systems , , , 
earthquake insurance , 
earthquakes , , , , , , ,
 n. 
Haiti () , –, , ,  n. 





Nepal () , , , , , ,  n. ,
 n. 
Tohoku  n. 
Ebola virus outbreak () –, , –,
–, , , , , , , 
economies of scale 
Eisenee, Thomas 
Elabed, Ghada 
electoral politics , , –
El Niño , 
El Salvador  n. 
emergency recovery phase 
emergency relief phase 
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Ethiopia , , ,  n. 
drought , , , ,  n. 
famine  n. 
funeral societies , –, 
indexed insurance protection , 
Productive Safety Net Programme
(PSNP) , , –, 
evidence-based decision-making , 
exaggeration of crises 
ex ante financial instruments , , –,
, , 
accuracy and speed , 
cost , –
discipline , 
ex post financial instruments , –, 
extreme weather events , , ,  n. 
famine 
China  n. ,  n. 
Ethiopia  n. 
India 
fast-onset disasters , , 
financial instruments –, –, 
as commitment devices –
ex post , –, , 
risk retention , , , , , 
risk transfer , , , , , ,
, , 
see also ex ante financial instruments




post-disaster , , –, , , –,
–, 
see also appeals; begging–bowl financing;
financial instruments; pre–disaster
planning
fire insurance  n. 
flood insurance 
floods , , , , , , , , , ,
, 
FONDEN (Fondo Nacional de Desastres
Naturales), Mexico –, –, –,
, , 
food delivery , –, 
Fox, B. D. 




Fuchs, Alan , 
funeral insurance systems , , –, 
gambler’s fallacy 
gaming of data systems , 
Gasper, J. 
Gawande, A. 
Germanwatch  n. 
Ghesquiere, Francis , 
Gigerenzer, Gerd 
global humanitarian system , ,  n. 
Goldstein, Daniel G. 
Gollier, C. 




group-based insurance –, –
Guatemala  n. 
Guinea, Ebola virus outbreak () 
Gurenko, Eugene 
Haiti  n. ,  n. 
earthquake () , –, , ,  n. 
Haque, T. 
Hardman, Luke 
Hazell, P. B. 
health –, 
health care delivery 
Healy, A. –
hidden action , 
Hill, R. , 
Hobson, M. 
Hoddinott, John  n. 
Hölstrom, B. 
homeowners’ insurance , 
Honduras  n. 
Hoyt, Robert E. 
Hsiang, S. M. 
humanitarian aid , , , , , 
humanitarian need 
Hunger Safety Net Programme, Kenya ,
, , , 
hurricanes 
Katrina (), US , , , , , 
hyperbolic preferences 
implementation of response plans 
command and control systems 
information systems 
scalable delivery systems 
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
implementers –, 
incentives, disaster risk reduction –, –,
, , , , 
indemnity insurance , , 
index-based insurance –, , , –,
, , , , 
indexed reinsurance , 
India , ,  n. 
agricultural insurance , , 
electoral behaviour , 
famine 
funeral insurance 
Indian Ocean tsunami () ,  n. 
individual loss adjustment , –,
, 
infectious diseases , 




infrastructure reconstruction , ,
–, 
in kind support , 
insurance , , –, , –, , , –,
,  n. 
agricultural , –, , –, , –,
, 
and certainty 
compulsory , , 
earthquake 
fire  n. 
flood 
fraud , –
funeral , , –, 
group-based –, –
homeowners’ , 
indemnity , , 
index-based –, , , –, , ,
, 
individual loss adjustment , –,
, 
parametric , , –, , , , ,
 nn.  and 
reinsurance , , , , , , , ,
 n. ,  n. 
as risk transfer instrument , 




(IDA)  n. 
International Monetary Fund 
international organizations , , , , ,
, , , , , 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement ,  n. 
Iran 
Irish Aid 
Jaffee, D. , 
Jamaica 
Janssen, Marijn 
Janzen, S. A. 
Japan , ,  n. 
Tōhoku earthquake  n. 
Jensen, Nathaniel Duane 




Kashmir earthquake () 
Kenya , , ,  n. ,  n. 
drought , , ,  n. 




Kunreuther, Howard C. , –
Kydland, Finn E. 
Lacker, J. M. –
Lam, J. 
leadership –, , , 
political , , , 
Le Maux, B. , 
Ley-Borrás, R. 
Liberia, Ebola virus outbreak () 
Lindbeck, A. 
Lind, Robert C. 
liquidity, cost of 
local governments , , , , , ,
, , 
logistics , , , –, 
loss aversion ,  n. 
losses, disaster 
Lucas, Robert E. Jr. 
Madrian, B. –
Mahul, Olivier , , , 
Malawi 
Malhotra, N. –
Mali  n. 
Marshall Islands  n. 
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
Mauritania  n. 
media reports , , , , 
Mexico , , –, 
CADENA programme 
Cyclone Patricia () 
earthquake () 
National Disaster Fund (FONDEN) –,
–, –, , , 
Michel-Kerjan, E. O. 
minimal response , 
Mitter, Rana  n. 
Mobarak, Ahmed Mushfiq
, 
moral hazard , , , 
Morduch, J. 
Myanmar  n. 
Narita, D. 
national governments , , , , , ,
–, , , 
disaster preparedness spending
–
disaster relief spending 
risk diversification 
risk ownership , , 
time-inconsistent preferences 
need , , , 




Nepal earthquake () , , , , , ,
– n. ,  nn.  and 
New Zealand 
New Zealand Earthquake
Commission  n. 
Nicaragua  n. 
Niger  n. ,  n. 
Nocco, Brian W. 
non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) , , , , , , ,
, 
Nyakatoke, Tanzania 
O’Donoghue, T. ,  n. 
Odyssean pact 
omission bias  n. 
Osborne, M. J. 
Overseas Development Institute and Centre
for Global Development  n. 
ownership of risks , , , –, , ,
, 
Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and
Financing Initiative (PCRAFI) , 
n. 
Pacific Community , 
Panama ,  n. 
pandemics , , , , , , 
see also Ebola
parametric insurance , , –, , ,
, ,  nn.  and 
Pauly, M. –
Pelham, L. 
pension savings/schemes , –
Peru ,  n. 
Phaup, Marvin 
Philippines , ,  n. ,  n. 
Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) , ,  n. 
Picard, P. 
planning, pre-disaster see pre-disaster
planning
political decision-making , –
political leadership , , , 
political statements –
politicians , , , , –, , , , 
politics –
of credible pre-disaster plans –
electoral , 
Pomeroy, G. 
Porter, Catherine  n. 
post-disaster financing , , –, , ,
–, –, 
see also appeals; begging–bowl financing
post-disaster needs assessment , , 
n. 
pre-disaster planning , , , –, ,
–, 
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